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Deterring Roper's Juveniles: Using a Law
and Economics Approach to Show that the
Logic of Roper Implies that Juveniles

Require the Death Penalty More Than
Adults
Moin A. Yahya*
Abstract
In Roper v. Simmons, the United States Supreme Court declared the
death penalty for juveniles unconstitutional. It relied on three reasons,
one of which concerns this article, namely the theory that juveniles are
less culpable and deterrable than adults. The Court relied on the
American Medical Association's amicus brief, which purported to
scientifically show that juveniles had less developed brains than adults.
The Court characterized juveniles as being risk-lovers who highly prefer
the present over the future, who love gains no matter how risky, who do
not care for losses, and who cannot engage in proper cost-benefit
analysis. This is because juveniles underestimate the odds of being
caught and convicted. For these three reasons, the Court held that
juveniles were not only less deterrable, but that they were also not as
culpable as adults. This paper takes issue with this logic, especially the
idea that juveniles cannot be deterred. If indeed juveniles are risk-lovers
who cannot engage in cost-benefit analysis, because they prefer the
present and misperceive the odds of being caught and punished, then the
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proper response is to increase the penalties that juveniles face. Using
law and economics methodology, I will apply a simple numerical
example to illustrate that juveniles can be deterred no matter how
abnormal their preferences are. The deterrence, however, comes at a
penalty much higher than what would be required to deter a normal riskaverse individual. One can think of juveniles as demanders of crime,
meaning they have a very inelastic demand for crime. Thinking of
punishment as the price of crime necessitates a very high price to deter
juveniles, a price much higher than what adults should face. The
Supreme Court, by abolishing the death penalty for juveniles, deprived
the States of a valuable tool to combat juvenile violence. In this paper, I
also introduce empirical evidence from a series of econometric studies
that show that juveniles can indeed be deterred by punishment to the
same degree as adults. It follows that if adults can be deterred by the
death penalty, then so can juveniles. A plethora of econometric studies
have emerged showing that the death penalty reduces homicides and
saves lives. The evidence of juveniles' responsiveness to punishment
belies the medical claims advanced by opponents of the death penalty for
juveniles. Furthermore, I argue that the only criteria for culpability is the
ability to tell right from wrong, a trait that even the opponents of juvenile
executions conceded juveniles possess. I also show that many violent
adult criminals suffer from the same medical characterizations that typify
Roper's juveniles. Therefore, to rely on medical evidence to decide who
should be spared the death penalty is an absurd proposition, and medical
characterizations should be reserved for what medicine does best, namely
treat and cure illnesses.

I.

Introduction

About a year ago, the United States Supreme Court, in Roper v.
Simmons,' declared unconstitutional the death penalty for juveniles, a
decision that proved controversial at the time, 2 and continues to be

1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
2. For reaction to the decision, see: James Carlson, Victim's Sister Tries to Live on:
She Feels Court Thwarted Justice in Banning Execution of Juveniles, ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, July 24, 2005, at BI ; Sarah H. Cleveland, Is There Room for the World in Our
Courts?, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2005, at B04; Christopher Shea, A Scientific Flip-Flop,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 2005, at D5; Jeff Jacoby, A Phony 'Consensus' on Youthful
Killers, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 2005, at DlI; Ed Quillen, When Does Adulthood
Arrive?, DENVER POST, Mar. 8, 2005, at B07; George F. Will, Injudicious Justice;
Regarding Teen Executions, Anthony Kennedy Inexcusably Plays to the Crowd, PITT.
POST-GAZ., Mar. 7, 2005, at AI5; Opinion, Justices out on a Limb; and, A Healthy Moral
Decision on Juvenile Capital Punishment Arrives via a Path Strewn with Logical and
Legal Dangers, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 4, 2005, at B8.
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controversial today. Recently, Justice Thomas Parker of the Alabama
Supreme Court lambasted the U.S. Supreme Court for its "blatant
that
judicial tyranny" and called the case an "unconstitutional opinion"
3
his colleagues on the Alabama high court should actively resist.
Most of the controversy seems to have stemmed from the reliance
by the majority on international legal norms against executing juveniles.4
This Article, however, will address the view of the Court that juveniles
lack the mental capacity to be deterred, thereby making capital
punishment of juveniles ineffective. I will argue that, if this claim were
true, the logical implication should be precisely the opposite of the
Court's holding. My critique will utilize a law and economics approach
in evaluating the implications of the majority's opinion.
In Roper, Christopher Simmons, a seventeen-year-old Missouri
teenager, decided to kill someone.5 He even bragged about it, believing,
incorrectly at the time, that he would not face the death penalty because
of his age.6 He elaborately schemed with two of his friends to commit a
murder. 7 He and one of these friends ultimately entered a house at night
where a woman was alone. 8 They bound her and took her to a remote
area where they murdered her. 9 Simmons was caught, convicted, and
sentenced to die.10 Although his appeal was unsuccessful,"1 his luck
turned for the better when he brought a state habeas corpus petition.' 2
The Missouri Supreme Court commuted his death sentence to life in
prison, holding that executing juveniles was unconstitutional under the
U.S Constitution. 3 Despite an earlier United States Supreme Court
The reaction in the blogosphere was equally unequivocal. See e.g., The Buck Stops
Here, Roper v. Simmons, Mar 2, 2005, http://stuartbuck.blogspot.com/2005/03/roper-v1, 2005,
Roper v. Simmons, March
Professor Bainbridge,
simmons.html;

http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2005/03/emroper-v_simmo.html;

Volokh

Conspiracy (Orin Kerr), Roper v. Simmons and Capital Litigation, March 1, 2005,
http://volokh.com/posts/l 109726269.shtml.

3.

Stephanie Francis Ward, Judge Wants Justices Denied, 5 No. 2 A.B.A. J. E-

Report 4 (2006); Tony Mauro, Clarion Call, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 27, 2006, at 1.

4. See Donald J. Kochan, No Longer Little Known But Now a Door Ajar: An
Overview of the Evolving and DangerousRole of the Alien Tort Statute in Human Rights
and International Law Jurisprudence, 8 CHAP. L. REv. 103. 128-29 (2005); see also
Ernesto J. Sanchez, A Case against Judicial Internationalism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 185,
209-15 (2005); Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 291, 298-312 (2005).
5. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556.
6. Id.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
State
State
Id.

557.
557-558.
v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165. 191 (Mo. 1997).
ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003).
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ruling permitting the execution of sixteen and seventeen-year-olds, 14 the
Missouri Supreme Court reasoned that a national consensus had formed
against executing juveniles. 15 Taking their cue from a more recent
United States Supreme Court case that prohibited executing the mentally
retarded (also based on a national consensus), 16 the Missouri Supreme
Court anticipated that the Supreme Court would prohibit executing those
under the age of eighteen.' 7 The United States Supreme Court did affirm
the ruling by the Missouri Supreme Court and, in the process, prohibited
the execution of juveniles nationally. 18 Justice Kennedy wrote for the
majority, which consisted of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and
Souter. 19 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist wrote a joint dissent,
while Justice O'Connor dissented separately.20
In striking down the death penalty for juveniles, Justice Kennedy
relied on three grounds. 21 The first was that a national consensus had
formed against juvenile executions. 22 The second was that juveniles
have diminished culpability and maturity, rendering them less
blameworthy and less deterrable than adults. 3 The third was the
growing international consensus against executing juveniles; a consensus
that the majority claimed was not dispositive for the outcome, but
persuasive.24 It is the second ground that this Article focuses on.
Numerous scholars will undoubtedly address the first and the third
grounds in the years to come. 25
14. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). The United States Supreme
Court had earlier ruled that mitigating evidence should be allowed to be introduced as
evidence in favor of an accused murderer who was sixteen at the time of the murder.
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1982). In Application of Gault, the
Supreme Court held that juveniles had the same rights as adults, such as the right to
counsel, the right of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the privilege
against self-incrimination. 387 U.S. 1, 41,55, 57 (1967). In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the
execution of 15 year olds was declared unconstitutional. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). For
a discussion of the earlier cases, and juvenile justice in general, see Barry C. Feld,
Juvenile and CriminalJustice System's Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST.
189 (1998).
15. State ex rel. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 407-09.
16. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
17. State ex rel. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 413.
18. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
19. Id. at 554.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 563-78.
22. Id. at 563-68.
23. Id. at 569-74.
24. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78.
25. On the citation to foreign law, see, for example: Kenneth Anderson, Foreign
Law and the U.S. Constitution, 131 POL'Y REV. 33, 34-37 (2005), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=771124; Eugene Kontorovich,
Disrespecting the 'Opinions of Mankind': International Law in Constitutional
Interpretation, 8 GREEN BAG 261, 261-62 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie D.
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This Article looks at the idea of juvenile culpability and maturity
and whether a diminution of rational decision-making can logically
require a lesser sentence than that which an adult would receive. The
Supreme Court claimed that the diminished reasoning and greater
impulsiveness and recklessness which characterizes juveniles mean that
juveniles are not only less blameworthy, but also undeterrable.26 I argue
that, if anything, these characteristics should lead to the opposite
conclusion. If youth cannot be reasoned with, then the optimal thing to
do is to raise the penalty to a degree that would deter them. This
necessarily means raising the penalty above that which would be needed
to deter someone who can be reasoned with.
Juvenile crime rates are unacceptably high, and yet the severity of
punishments for juveniles has been diminishing.27 Figure 1 shows the
crime rates for various age groups. While these numbers dropped over
the last decade, the crime rate among young Americans is still higher
than the overall crime rate.28 Adults are being punished more harshly
every day, sometimes with draconian sentences, while juveniles get away
with murder.29
The seriousness and heinousness of juvenile crimes has been getting
worse over time. For example, Michael Johnson will soon walk free
only seven years after he and an eleven-year-old accomplice fatally shot
four schoolmates and a teacher as a thirteen year old. 30 The two had
taken part in what became known as the Columbine Copycat attacks,
named after the massacre in Columbine Colorado where two juveniles
who massacred their classmates and teachers. 31 Lionel Tate was twelve
years old when he killed a six-year-old girl.32 He received life in prison,
Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of
Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 passim
(2005); and, Thomas G. Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. &
MARY

BILL

RTs.

J.

2

(2005),

available

at

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=703103.
For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's claim of national consensus, see Mitchel Brim, A Sneak Preview Into
How the Court Took Away a State's Right to Execute Sixteen and Seventeen Year Old
Juveniles: The Threat of Execution Will No Longer Save an Innocent Victim's Life, 82
DENY. U. L. REV. 739, 749-52 (2005).
26. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570-71.
27. Steven D. Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1156, 1181
(1998) [hereinafter Levitt].
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1156-57.
30. Melissa Nelson, CONCERN Townspeople Say it is too Soon; Boy who Killed will
be Free at 21, THE ADVERTISER, Aug. 12, 2005, at 34.
31. See David Washburn, Experts Say Copycat Shooting Just a Matter of When,
Where, SAN DIEGO UN.-TRIB., Mar. 23, 2001, at A20.
32. John-Thor Dahlburg, Young Killer Arrested in Pizza Holdup, L.A. TIMES, May
25, 2005, at A13.
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only to have the sentence overturned on appeal.3 3 Recently, Lionel
decided to order pizza and rob the deliveryman at gunpoint. 34 A
fourteen-year-old boy was recently arrested for allegedly raping a
thirteen-year-old girl in their school bathroom. 35 Another incident
resulted in the death of two teenagers when a sixteen year old decided to
36
fire a pistol in the air outside a house, where he was attending a party.
This prompted another teenager, driving by in a Cadillac, to fire into the
crowd of partygoers. 37 A sixteen-year-old girl hired her seventeen-yearold boyfriend to fatally stab her father because she was unhappy with her
father's strict discipline.38 The stories are endless and the crimes are
heinous. The states, therefore, need the maximum flexibility to design
their criminal codes to combat juvenile crime.

33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Steve Rubenstein, Boy, 14, Held after Girl, 13, Reports Rape, SAN FRAN.
CHRONICLE, May 19, 2005, at B4.
36. Kathy Jefcoats, Drive-by Shooting Leaves more Tragedy in its Wake, ATLANTA
JOUR.-CONST., Apr 30, 2005, at I E.
37. Id.
38. Andrew Tilghman, Suspect Will be Tried as an Adult; She is Accused of Hiring
Boyfriend to Kill Her Father When She Was 16, HOUST. CHRONICLE, Feb. 12, 2005, at

B5.
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Figure 1: Arrest Rates for Violent Crimes by Age Group
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics
(http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm#data)
Part II of this Article will discuss the Supreme Court's treatment of
juvenile's diminished culpability and maturity. Part III will then
translate the Supreme Court's characterization of juveniles into economic
terms, and demonstrate the logical flaw of the Supreme Court's analysis.
Part IV will canvass the economics literature as it relates to juvenile
rationality and responsiveness to both positive and negative incentives,
with a specific emphasis on whether juveniles can be deterred from
committing crimes. Part V will suggest some thoughts on what the
optimal punishment for juveniles should be. Part VI will take a brief
look at how our society has changed its perception of juveniles and
juvenile responsibilities. Part VII will offer some concluding thoughts.
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Diminished Culpability: Roper's Juveniles

A.

The Majority

Juveniles, the Supreme Court tells us, are different from adults in
three respects. 39 The first is that juveniles lack the maturity of adults,
leading them sometimes to engage in ill-considered and reckless actions
and decisions. 40 The second difference is that "juveniles are more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure," as they have "less control, or less experience
with control, over their own environment. 4 1 The third distinction is that
"the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult"
because the "personality traits of juveniles are more transitory" and "less
fixed" than that of adults.42 These differences, the Supreme Court
concluded, mean that the conduct of a juvenile is "not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult., 43 The Supreme Court argued that
juveniles cannot be held to the same standards as adults when they are so
vulnerable and lack control over their immediate surroundings.4 4 Since
juveniles are still struggling to define their character, even heinous
crimes committed by juveniles do not indicate a depravity of character as
it might if an adult had committed a similar crime.45 This diminished
culpability of juveniles, therefore, meant that the "penological
justifications" that undergird the death penalty do not apply to
juveniles.4 6
The two distinct justifications for the death penalty,
according to prior Supreme Court jurisprudence, are retribution and
deterrence, both of which could not apply to juveniles due to their
diminished culpability.47
The Supreme Court then stated that diminished culpability meant
that society was not justified in imposing the extreme sanction of death
on juveniles because "[r]etribution is not proportional if the law's most
severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness
is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and
immaturity. '' 48 As to the issue of deterrence, the Supreme Court asserted
that there was no evidence that "the death penalty has a significant or
39.
40.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
Id.

41.

Id.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 570.
Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
Id.
Id. at 571.
Id.

48.

Id.
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even measurable deterrent effect on juveniles .,,49 The Court quoted the
plurality from an earlier case that had outlawed the execution of those
fifteen years old and under.50 The Court observed that "[t]he likelihood
that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that
attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be
virtually nonexistent." 5'
The Court also stated that "[t]o the extent the juvenile death penalty
might have residual deterrent effect, it is worth noting that the
punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself
a severe sanction, in particular for a young person., 5 2 The Court did
concede that juveniles may commit brutal crimes and that many juveniles
may have the same maturity level as adults.5 3 The Court rejected,
however, the suggestion that juries should be allowed to distinguish
between those juvenile offenders who suffer from a lack of maturity and
those who are mature and depraved, noting that even expert
psychologists find it difficult to differentiate between these two groups.54
The Supreme Court concluded that the death penalty for juveniles under
eighteen years of age would be unconstitutional. 55
B. Dueling Briefs and O'Connor'sDissent
No doubt the majority derived some of its certitude regarding
juvenile characteristics from the respondent's, Mr. Simmons's, brief, but
many of their assertions are contained in the amicus brief filed by the
American Medical Association ("AMA") as well as another brief filed by
the American Psychological Association ("APA").5 6 Justice O'Connor's
dissent,57 the petitioner's reply brief,58 as well as the amicus brief for the
State of Alabama, 59 attempted to rebut the claims made by the majority,
Mr. Simmons, the AMA, and the APA. Justice O'Connor's dissent,
which amplified the rebuttals made by the petitioner and the State of

49. Id.
50. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.
51. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 US 815, 837 (1988)).
52. Id. at 572.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 572-73.
55. Id. at 578-79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
56. Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association et al., Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological
Association et al., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
57. Roper, 543 U.S. at 587-607 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
58. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03633).
59. Brief of Amici Curiae Alabama et al., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
(No. 03-633).
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Alabama, took issue with the Court's analysis of juveniles and whether
the differences between juveniles and adults were sufficient to justify
outlawing sentencing juveniles to death.60
The AMA made several assertions in its brief. First, the AMA
argued that adolescents behave differently than adults because their
emotions are more volatile and because their brains are not as fully
developed. 6' The AMA conceded that adolescents have the ability to
"distinguish right from wrong" as well as the ability to conduct a costbenefit analysis. 62 The problem is that they are "risk takers" and they
63
lack the ability to "perceive and weigh risks and benefits accurately.,
They focus on "opportunities for gains" rather than "protection against
losses., 64 Furthermore, they focus on "short-term consequences" and
they "discount future consequences more than adults. 65
These
observations were the results of psychological and biological studies,
with the latter showing notable differences in brain structure.
For
example, juveniles rely on different brain regions for certain tasks than
do adults.6 7 The region that juveniles rely on for information processing
is the amygdala, which is a region associated with impulses such as
anger and aggression. 68 The region of the brain that adults rely on for
information processing, the frontal cortex, develops much later in
juveniles. 69 The AMA cited groundbreaking evidence from brain
imaging studies, showing "that the brain's frontal lobes are still
structurally immature well into late adolescence., 70 The prefrontal
cortex, which is associated with impulse control, risk assessment,
and
'7
1
mature.
to
regions
brain
last
the
of
"one
is
moral reasoning,
The APA, in its amicus brief, made similar claims.72 Adolescents
are risk takers by nature, and engage in criminal behavior on a larger
60. Roper, 543 U.S. at 598-601.
61. Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association et al. at 5, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 10-20 (relying heavily on Elizabeth R. Sowell et. al, Mapping Continued
Brain Growth and Gray Matter Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse
Relationships During Postadolescent Brain Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8819, 8026
(2001)).
67. Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association et al. at 11, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633).

68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 16 (citations omitted).

71.

Id. (citations omitted).

72. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. at 5, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633).
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scale than do adults.7 3 Juveniles, as a group, have the highest ratio of
criminals, with the ratio growing steeply each year until it peaks at age
eighteen, at which point it drops off.74 This statistical observation is true
in numerous Western nations.75 The APA also argued that adolescents
are less focused on the future and less likely to appreciate the true costs
and benefits of their actions.76 This again, the APA claimed, was largely
due to biological reasons.77 The APA further asserted that juveniles are
so psychologically complex that it is impossible to determine whether a
particular juvenile criminal was the immature type whose life should be
spared or a psychopath whose life one could justify taking.78
The petitioner, the State of Missouri, responded to these briefs by
disputing the science that suggested juveniles were neither culpable nor
deterrable. 79 They pointed out that the APA had claimed that juveniles
were mature enough to decide whether to have an abortion without the
80
need for parental supervision.
In addition, they suggested that there
was little difference between juveniles' cognitive capacities and that of
adults.' 81 As to the risk-taking, the petitioner pointed out that what
adults label as risk-taking may be acceptable behavior for juveniles in
order to gain experience and learning. 82 Similarly, conduct that juveniles
regard as rational may be regarded as irrational for adults.83 The
petitioner also rebutted the claims of biological differences between
adults and juveniles by questioning the scientific validity of the studies.84
The State of Missouri claimed that the studies were inconclusive and, at
85
best, speculative.
Justice O'Connor also took aim at the majority's claims of why the
differences between juveniles and adults justified a ban on their
execution. 86 O'Connor believed that the majority did not explain how
73. Id.
74. Id. at 5-6.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Id. at 7.
77. Id. at 7-9.
78. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. at 23, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633). The respondent's brief made similar claims as the
AMA and the APA, although the Court seems to have been influenced by the latter two
briefs. See Brief for Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
79. Brief for Petitioner, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
80. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 9, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633)
(citing the APA's amicus brief in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)).
81. Id.atlo-11.
82. Id. at 12 (citing L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-related Behavioral
Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAV. REv. 417, 422 (2000)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 13-14.
85. Id.
86. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 598 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the fact that juveniles were less culpable than adults meant that they were
not sufficiently culpable to be executed.87 She also argued that just
because the death penalty may be less likely to deter juveniles than adults
did not mean that the threat of the death penalty was not an effective
threat to prevent some juveniles from committing crimes.88 In addition,
O'Connor questioned the validity of comparing juveniles and adults as
separate groups. 89 Simply because the average youth is less mature than
the average adult does not mean that the particular juvenile who commits
a heinous crime is less culpable.90 There may be very mature and
calculating youth and very immature and naive adults, Justice O'Connor
argued. 91
Justice O'Connor's and the petitioner's strategy was to rebut the
scientific foundations and assumptions behind the AMA, APA, and
majority's claims. This paper takes a slightly different approach. Rather
than quibble with the claims made by the AMA, APA, and the majority, I
will show that their claims in fact argue for even more stringent penalties
than those meted out to adults. In fact, state governments should be
allowed to use the ultimate sanction of the death penalty precisely
because adolescents are reckless, immature, and unable to properly
weigh the consequences of their actions. In addition, state governments
should have the flexibility to devise punishments that would not
ordinarily be administered to adults, such as corporal punishment. Later
in this article, I will question some of the scientific claims regarding
juveniles' maturity by looking at economic studies that have studied the
question of juvenile behavior.
III.

The Economic Implications of Roper

As stated earlier, the majority of the Supreme Court in Roper, in
addition to the AMA, and the APA, made three claims regarding
juveniles. The claims, while not bringing into question a juvenile's
rationality or ability to engage in cost-benefit analysis per se, suggest
that juveniles are incapable of making correct decisions. The first claim,
supporting the position that juveniles are incapable of making correct
decisions, is that juveniles are risk lovers. The second claim is that
juveniles discount future consequences more than adults by focusing
more on "opportunities for gains" rather than "protection against losses."
The final claim is that juveniles fail to "perceive and weigh risks and

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 599.
Id. at 600.
Id. at 600-01.
Id. at 601.
Id.
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benefits accurately."
When viewed through a law and economics lens, these claims imply
behavioral consequences for which an economist could generate policy
implications. The policy implications of the three claims regarding
juveniles would actually be the opposite of the Supreme Court's ruling.
If juveniles indeed have the aforementioned characteristics, then they
should be punished more severely than adults. 92 Juveniles, to use the
language of economics, have an inelastic demand for criminal activity,
and the price of their crimes, namely the punishment associated with it,
must be high (and as immediate) as possible. I shall deal separately with
each of the three claims, namely, risk-loving, heavy discounting of the
future, and incorrect perception of risks and benefits.
A.

Reckless Youth

The majority did not advance the claim of irrationality, and in fact,
the AMA explicitly denied that juveniles were irrational.93 The majority
in Roper and the AMA stressed, however, that juveniles were incapable
of correctly assessing the proper costs and benefits of crime due to their
love for risk.94
Economics Nobel Laureate Gary Becker pioneered the modem
rational actor model of crime (also known as the law and economics of
crime). 95 The model, in its simplest form, posits that, since criminals
gain from committing crimes, the state should impose sanctions that
exceed criminals' gains in order to deter them. To take a simplistic
92. So far, the one law and economics study that seems to agree with the decision in
Roper is Michael E. O'Neill, Irrationalityand the Criminal Sanction, 12 SuP. CT. ECON.
REV. 139 (2004). For a view that would probably support my own, see Terrence Chorvat
& Kevin McCabe, Neuroeconomics and Rationality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1235 (2005).
93. Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association et al. at 6, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633).
94. Roper, 543 U.S. 551, 579-81 (2005); Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical
Association et al. at 6, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633).
95. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968). For more on the law and economics approach to crime, see the
following articles: STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 471
(2004); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 502 (Pearson Addison

Wesley 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter COOTER & ULEN]; John Dilulio, Help Wanted:
Economists, Crime and Public Policy, 10 J ECON. PERSP. 3 (1996); Isaac Ehrlich, Crime
Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J ECON. PERSP. 43 (1996) [hereinafter
Ehrlich]; Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUMBIA L.
REV. 1193 (1985); Michael K. Block & Robert C. Lind, An Economics Analysis of
Crimes Punishable by Imprisonment, 4 J. LEG. STUD. 479 (1975); and, George J. Stigler,
The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970). For a comprehensive
survey of the literature, see Erling Eide, Economics of Criminal Behavior in 4 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 345 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest

eds., 2000).
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example, suppose a criminal gains $100 every time he robs a
convenience store. Suppose also that the probability of detection and
conviction is 10%. The state should then impose a penalty that is at least
$1000 in magnitude either in the form of a fine or time served in prison,
creating an opportunity cost to the criminal of $1000. This simple model
gives the reader a very basic idea of how an economist would approach
the question of crime and punishment.
Implicit in the previous example was the assumption that the
individual committing the crime was risk-neutral. Risk neutrality means
that an individual who is given the choice of a gamble or a certain
outcome whose value is equal to the expected value of the gamble will
be indifferent between the two. For example, if a gamble paid $100 with
probability 2 and $0 also with probability , the expected value of this
gamble would be 2 x 100 +

2 x 0=$50. A risk-neutral individual would

be indifferent between the two choices. A risk-averse individual, on the
other hand, would prefer the certain value of $50 to the gamble. In
contrast, a risk-lover prefers the gamble to the certain value of $50.96
96. The concept of risk aversion can be derived from a basic economic concept
called the diminishing marginal utility of income. One of the basic building blocks of
economic models is the utility function. Each individual is assumed to possess a utility
function that takes as an input the consumer's level of consumption of goods and services
and generates as an output the level of utility or satisfaction to the consumer. While
fictional, nonetheless the utility function serves as a useful tool for understanding
economic behavior. Suppose for example, that an individual had a utility function given
by U = vx, so that the individual received utility equal to the square root of the
consumption of quantity x of any good. Hence, if the individual consumed 4 units of
apples, she would receive 2 units of satisfaction, and so on. This discussion of consumer
demand is a simplified form of standard economic theory. The reader can consult any
economics textbook for more details. For a discussion on diminishing marginal utility,
see ROBERT PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 90 (5th ed. 2000) and
BRIAN BINGER & ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, MICROECONOMICS WITH CALCULUS 109 (1985)

[hereinafter Binger & Hoffman].

For a discussion on the utility function see ROBERT

PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMIcS 73 (5th ed. 2000) and BRIAN BINGER
& ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, MICROECONOMICS WITH CALCULUS 103 (1985).
For an
advanced discussion, see JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF
UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION
7-42 (1992) and JACK HIRSHLEIFER, TIME,

UNCERTAINTY, AND INFORMATION 98-122 (1989).
Utility functions are also assumed to exhibit diminishing marginal returns, which
means that the more the consumer consumes, the less extra-satisfaction she gets from the
last unit consumed. While the consumer receives more satisfaction from consuming
more units, the marginal increase in satisfaction is decreasing. Hence, if the consumer,
with the utility function of U = vIx-,ate one apple, she would receive one unit of utility.
If she ate four apples, which would be an increase of three apples, she would only receive
two units of utility. Consuming nine apples, which would be an extra five apples, only
gives her three units of satisfaction, which is only one more unit of satisfaction than had
she eaten four apples. The increase in satisfaction is known as the marginal utility, and
so, in the previous example, the marginal utility from consuming the first unit of apples
was one, the marginal utility from consuming the next three units was one, and the
marginal utility from consuming the next five units was also one.
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There has been some debate in the economics literature about
whether criminals are risk-averse or risk-loving.97 Whatever the case
may be, increasing the penalty or the probability of detection and
conviction can deter both a risk-averse or risk-loving individuals. The
penalty can be increased by increasing the fine or the amount of time
spent in jail, or a combination of both. Finally, the maximum penalty of
death may be instituted. Since most punishments are imposed many
months or years after the crime was committed, criminals discount the
cost of their crime. Therefore, speeding up a criminal's punishment, by
limiting appeals or by expediting trials and appeals for the criminally
accused, would also raise the penalty as perceived by the criminal. 98
Gary Becker had speculated that criminals are risk-loving. 99 In his
mathematical model of criminal behavior he assumed that when a
The idea of deriving utility from consuming goods and services can also be applied
to income. Individuals derive utility from their income, because the income can
ultimately be used to purchase the goods and services that they wish to consume. An
individual gains far more satisfaction from making an extra $10,000 in income when her
initial income was $10,000 then when her initial income was $1 million. Given that an
individual gains less satisfaction from the extra income at higher levels of income, the
converse is also true, i.e. an individual will not lose as much satisfaction if they lose
$10,000 in income when their initial income was $1 million as opposed to when their
initial income was $10,000. This should suggest to the reader that an individual who is
offered the opportunity to participate in a lottery that pays $10,000 or $0 with equal odds
is more likely to partake in the lottery if his income is $1 million than if his income were
$10,000. This example illustrates the concept of risk aversion. The lottery represents the
risk and uncertainty that faces the consumer. Therefore, as the individual has more
income, the individual will be less averse to taking risks.
A risk-loving individual, on the other hand, derives more utility from consumption
of income as the units consumed increase. Such an individual's utility can be represented
by a function such as U=x2 .
97. See Michael K. Block & Vernon E. Gerety, Some Experimental Evidence on the
Differences Between Student and PrisonerReactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk, 24
J. LEG. STUD. 123 (1995); Jeffery Groggier, Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, 29
EcON. INQUIRY 297 (1991).
98. For a discussion of how the perception of the penalty instead of the actual
penalty is what really matters, see Harold J. Brumm & Dale 0. Cloninger, PerceivedRisk
of Punishment and the Commission of Homicides: A CovarianceStructureAnalysis, 31 J.
ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 1 (1996) and Maynard L. Erickson, Jack P. Gibbs, & Gary F.
Jensen, The Deterrence Doctrine and the Perceived Certainty of Legal Punishments, 42
AM. Soc. REV. 305 (1977).
99. Becker, supra note 95, at 178; but see William M. Brown & Morgan 0.
Reynolds, Crime and "Punishment":Risk Implications, 6 J. ECON. THEORY 508, 513-14
(1973) (taking issue with Becker's results on the grounds that Becker's results are
specific to his mathematical formulation and cannot necessarily be generalized); see also
Raymond Dacey, The S-Shaped Utility Function, 135 SYNTHESE 243, 257-62 (2003)
(showing that alternative specification can explain why criminals respond more to a
change in the probability of detection than the severity of punishment) [hereinafter
Dacey]; William S. Neilson & Harold Winter, On Criminal's Risk Attitudes, 55 ECON.
LETTERS 97, 102 (1997) (showing that criminals can respond more to a change in the
probability of detection than the severity of punishment and still be risk-averse).
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criminal commits a crime, it would net him income Yif he is not caught
and income Y-f (where f is the fine) if caught. 00° The criminal will be
caught with probability p, and so the expected utility for the criminal is
(l-p)U(Y-f)+pU(Y), where U is the utility function of the
criminal.10 1 If the criminal is risk-averse, then the utility function will be
concave, meaning that the criminal will display a diminishing marginal
utility of income. Such a criminal will be deterred more by an increase
in the penalty than by an increase in the probability of detection; a 1%
increase in penalty will deter more than a 1% increase in probability of
apprehension and conviction. The opposite is true if the criminal is riskloving; a 1% increase in the probability of detection will deter more than
a corresponding increase in the penalty. Nevertheless, in both cases, an
increase in the penalty will deter the criminal to a certain extent.
A numerical example can be helpful in understanding this. Suppose
an individual is risk-averse. This individual will have a utility function
that could be represented by U = 'x, where x is the income the
individual receives. 10 2 Suppose the individual has an annual income of
$10,000. This income does not depend on whether he commits a crime
or not. Now suppose that he could commit a crime that will give him
actual or psychic income of $1000 per year. 10 3 If he is caught and
convicted, he will pay a fine off.104 The probability of being caught and
convicted in this example is 20%. In this case, the individual compares
the expected utility of committing the crime, which entails a 20% chance
of being caught and having income 10,000-f or an 80% chance of having
an income of $11,000, with the certain utility of not committing the
crime, which would net the individual an income of $10,000. This
means
that
the
individual
will
commit the
crime
if
0.8 11,000 +0.2/10,000-f > 1,000. To see the impact of increasingf
on a person's decision whether to commit a crime or not, I have plotted
the left hand side of the previous expression in Figure 2. The dotted line
in Figure 1 represents the utility of no crime or 10,000 . The reader can
see that when the fine is less than $3,500, the individual in the example

100.
101.

Becker, supra note 95, at 177 n.16.
See supra note 96 for details on utility functions.

102.

To see that this individual is indeed risk-averse, consider two choices that this

person could face: a gamble where the outcome is either $100 or $0 with equal
probabilities; or, a certain amount of $50, which is equal to the expected value of the

gamble. The utility of the certain amount is equal to U=,;6 = 7.07. The expected utility
of the gamble is 0.5,/100 + 0.5,40 = 5, and therefore, this individual will prefer the
certain amount to the gamble. This is the definition of a risk-averse person.
103. Psychic income is defined as the non-monetary or non-material satisfactions that
accompany an occupation or economic activity. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, Online
edition, available at http://dictionary.oed.com/.

104.

This could also be thought of as time in jail where he loses income equal tof
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will commit a crime, but when the fine rises above $3,500, the individual
will not carry out a crime.

Fi2ure 2

Now, suppose that the individual is risk-loving. In this case, we can
model his utility function as U = x 2 .105 Suppose that the income levels
and probability of detection are the same as in the previous example.
This means that the individual will commit a crime if
0.8(11,000) 2 +0.2(10,000-f) 2 > (10,000)2. Figure 3 shows that for
fines less than $6,000, the individual will carry out his crime, while he
will desist if fines are above $6,000. Two things should be noted:
1) there exists a penalty that will deter a risk-loving individual, but the
penalty required to deter was about 70% higher than what was needed to
deter the risk-averse individual.

105. See supra note 96. To see that this individual is indeed risk-loving, consider the
two choices that were introduced above. The utility of the certain amount is equal to
U =502= 2500. The expected utility of the gamble is 0.5(100)2 + 0.5(0)2 = 5,000.
Therefore, this individual will prefer the gamble to the certain outcome. This satisfies the
definition of a risk-loving person.
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Figure 3
If juveniles are indeed risk-loving, then states seeking to deter juveniles
from committing crimes would be better served by increasing penalties,
in addition to devoting more resources to detection and successful
prosecutions. Moreover, the state will need to increase penalties by a
substantially larger amount than it would if it wanted to deter risk-averse
individuals. Given that the Supreme Court's assumption was that adults
are typically more risk-averse than juveniles, the implication of their
logic is that penalties for juvenile should be much higher than those for
adults.
If juveniles are indeed risk-lovers, the Supreme Court, by removing
the ultimate sanction from the states' arsenal of punishments, has
unwittingly lowered the deterrence measures available to states
combating youth crime. States will now have to devote more resources
to policing, and prosecutions, thereby diverting resources that could have
been used to combat adult crime.
Another way to understand the proposition that even risk-lovers can
be deterred is to think of crime as a commodity that criminals consume.
Criminals, therefore, will demand crime just as they demand any other
commodity. For example, a person demands an apple because of its
good taste and its health qualities. Similarly, criminals demand crime for
the real and psychic income that it provides. The price charged for a
commodity determines the amount that consumers will purchase. A rise
in the price will ensure that less of the good is purchased. The converse
is also true. Some commodities have a very strong demand, meaning
that a slight increase in price will not deter consumers from purchasing
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them. We call the demand for these commodities inelastic. A 1%
increase in price will result in less than a 1% decrease in quantity
demanded by the consumers. Examples of such commodities include
necessary food items, electricity, and gasoline, which are goods that we
need in order to live comfortably. Commodities with an inelastic
demand may also include those that are addictive in nature, such as
tobacco and drugs, compelling the consumer to pay almost any price to
purchase them. Nevertheless, even goods with an inelastic demand will
see a drop in the amount demanded at some price level (usually quite
high).
Consider Figure 4. In it, D l and D2 represent the demand for two
goods. The demand curve Dl is inelastic, as seen from its steepness,
while D2 is not as steep and represents a more elastic demand. Demand
curve DI shows that, for this commodity, the quantity consumed will be
fifteen if the price is $15 each. Demand curve D2 shows that 200 units
will be demanded at a price of $15 each. When the price increases to
$90 the units consumed for both demand curves drops to ten. For Dl,
there is a one third drop in the units consumed (from fifteen to ten),
whereas for the same price increase there is a 95% drop in units
consumed for D2 (from 200 to 10). Clearly, the commodity whose
demand is represented by D2 is more sensitive, and, therefore, more
elastic to price fluctuations than the commodity represented by D2.
Price

90

Dl
/

15

10

15

D2

Quantity
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The demand for crime can also be modeled as a commodity. Ifjuveniles
are risk-lovers who do not estimate the odds of being caught, convicted,
and punished, and, if they prefer gains to losses, then their demand for
crime can be described as highly inelastic. This would imply that the
proper price of crime should be set much higher than the price set for
adults whose demand for crime is more elastic.
At the prevailing severity of punishment for juveniles, social
scientists and the courts may be tempted to say that juveniles are
undeterrable. Observing the results of the policy to punish juveniles less
severely leads one to the conclusion that the punishment for juvenile
crimes should be increased. However, the decision in Roper clearly has
removed that option to policy makers.
B.

Lovers of Gains and the Present; Eschewers of Losses and the
Future

Another claim made by the majority in Roper was that juveniles
discount the future much more heavily than adults do, resulting in
juveniles showing a greater love for gains and a greater disinterest for
losses. I will argue that this claim also does not defeat the case for the
juvenile death penalty. Instead, it bolsters the claim for using the death
penalty as a punishment for certain heinous juvenile crimes. First, I will
discuss the question of discounting. Then I will discuss the question of
juveniles' focus on gains and their disinterest in losses, with respect to
their actions, i.e., asymmetric preferences over gains and losses.
The idea of discounting is intuitive. All things being equal, we
would prefer the present to the future. If any individual were offered the
choice of one apple today versus one apple at some point in the future,
surely the choice would be the apple today. But, if the choice were one
apple today versus two apples tomorrow, the answer might be different.
For some quantity of apples, an individual will choose to forgo
consumption today in favor of waiting for the extra consumption
tomorrow. 10 6

Suppose an individual chose to accept $1.25 next year

instead of $1 today, then we could infer that this individual placed 25%
less value on consumption next year than today. Economists call this
25%, the "discount rate."' 0 7 This is the rate by which the individual
devalues the future as compared to the present. The value of the future

106. The idea of discounting is a well-known proposition in Economics and Finance.
For a general introduction, see Zvi BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 101-42 (2000)
[hereinafter BODIE & MERTON]; see also Shane Fredrick, George F. Loewenstein, & Ted
O'Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 90 J. ECON.
LIT. 351 (2002).
107. BODIE&MERTON, supra note 106, at 110.
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today is called "present value." 10 8 If an individual's discount rate is very
high, then even high amounts in the future will be valued much less
today. For example, consider two individuals, one of whom has a
discount rate of 5%, and another who has a discount rate of 10%.
Suppose that they are both faced with the choice of accepting $100 today
or $107 next year. The first individual discounts the future at 5%, and
hence values $107 next year today at
107
-- = $102.
1.05
The present value to this individual of $107 is $102. This implies that he
will prefer to wait a year to accept $100 rather than accepting the $100
today. The second individual, on the other hand, will accept the $100
today, as the present value of $107 is

107

___ = $97.

1.10
Thus, the higher the discount rate, the more impatient the individual is.
Higher discount rates lead to lower present values and a greater desire for
present consumption.
Individuals can discount future losses the same way that they
discount future gains. A criminal who will face a fine of $100 next year
will only compare the present value of the fine with the payoff from
committing the crime today. Hence a crime that pays $100 today will
require a fine of at least $100 x (1+r), where r is the discount rate of the
individual. If r=5%, for example, then the fine would have to be equal to
at least $105 to make the crime an unattractive proposition. Suppose,
however, that the individual's discount rate was 10%. In this case, the
penalty would have to be at least $110. The higher the discount, (i.e. the
more impatient the individual) the higher the punishment has to be. The
Supreme Court and the AMA tell us that the discount rate of juveniles is
very high. Therefore, as I have demonstrated above, the solution is not
to lower the punishment for juveniles, but rather, to raise it.
Recall the argument that juveniles are impulsive and do not consider
the cost of punishment no matter how high the future cost.
Impulsiveness is actually not a criticism unique to juveniles. In fact,
psychologists and economists have long held the idea that people
irrationally prefer small present gains to larger future gains. For
example, it has been observed that many would prefer $50 today to $100
a year from now. When presented with the choice of $50 ten years from
now versus $100 in eleven, however, most prefer the $100 in eleven
years. This inconsistency has led many economists to posit that our
discount rates are not constant; instead, we engage in "hyperbolic
108.

Id.
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discounting."' 10 9
Our discount rates, economists argue, are extremely high when we
are concerned about present events. 110 Our discount rates are much
lower when the choice involves events that occur in the future."'
Hyperbolic discounting has been cited as an explanation for why many
procrastinate when they should be doing other things, such as filling out
l 2
their taxes, trying to quit smoking, or scheduling a medical checkup."
Hyperbolic discounting may also explain why food stamp recipients eat
10-15% more at the beginning of the month than at the end of the
month 1 3 and why some people spend their money as soon as they make
it instead of saving for retirement. 114 Whether or not hyperbolic
discounting explains much of our hastiness," l5 the evidence shows that
impulsiveness is a characteristic shared by all members of society, and
not just juveniles. If there is an actual distinction to be made between
adults and juveniles, the distinction may lie with the level of patience
that an average juvenile has in comparison to an average adult. Justice
O'Connor, 6in Roper, made observations regarding the immaturity of
11
juveniles.
If indeed juveniles are hasty and impulsive, the same is true of
many adults. Yet, no one would, or could, claim to excuse these adults
from any moral culpability if they committed a heinous crime.
Pedophiles, for example, are characterized, according to many
psychiatrists, as having impulse control disorders,'
and yet no one
would claim that they should be less morally culpable than "normal"
adults. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has upheld civil
109. A comprehensive introduction to the subject of hyperbolic discounting can be
found in GEORGE AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL 27-47 (2001) and GEORGE AINSLIE,
56-95 (1992).
Id.
Id.
Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J.

PICOECONOMICS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

110.
111.
112.

ECON. 121 (2001).

113. Jesse M. Shapiro, Is There a Daily Discount Rate? Evidence from the Food
Stamp Nutrition Cycle, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 303 (2005).

114.

Peter Diamond & Botond Koszegi, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and

Retirement, Is There a Daily Discount Rate? Evidence from the Food Stamp Nutrition
Cycle, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1839, 1859-61 (2003).

115. For a skeptical view, see Ariel Rubinstein, "Economics and Psychology"? The
Case of Hyperbolic Discounting, 44 INT. ECON. REV. 1207, 1214-15 (2003) (arguing that
much of the observed anomalies in behavior cannot be adequately explained by
hyperbolic discounting).
116. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 599 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
117. Lisa J. Cohen & Igor I. Galynker, Clinical Features of Pedophilia and
Implicationsfor Treatment, 8 J. PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 276, 281 (2002) (citing Dan J.
Stein et. al, Sexual Disorders not Otherwise Specified: Compulsive, Addictive or
Impulsive, 5 CNS SPECTRUMS: THE INT. J. NEUROPSYCHIATRIC MED. 60, 64 (2000))

[hereinafter Cohen & Galynker].

2006]

DETERRING ROPER'S JUVENILES

commitments of sexual offenders, after they have served their criminal
sentences, because of the fear that such offenders will re-offend. 1 8
Juveniles should, therefore, be no less culpable simply because they are
impulsive. States, therefore, should be allowed to set punishments high
enough to deter juveniles from committing crimes.
If a higher discount rate spares the lives of juvenile murderers, then
surely adult criminals who have similar discount rates should also be
spared. However, the discount rates of adults, like that of juveniles vary
from person to person. Discount rates are not homogenous across a
section of the population. For example, some adults are savers and some
are borrowers. At the prevailing market interest rates, some individuals
prefer to lend money to the bank, while others borrow. In fact, the
variance between personal discount rates can be as high as 30%.119 One
study found personal discount rates varied from 17 to 243%.120 The
same study found that white families, who were rich and educated, had
much lower discount rates than poor, non-white, non-educated
families. 121 It would be a curious result if non-educated, non-white, poor
borrowers were spared the death penalty for a murder, while a rich white
saving individual could be executed for the same crime. But, if the logic
of Roper were to apply, that would be exactly the type of result we
should expect.
As to the claim that juveniles prefer gains to losses, the response is
similar. The idea that there can be asymmetric preferences over gains
and losses is not new to economists. Two psychologists/economists,
Kahneman and Tversky, pioneered the area of behavioral economics.122
In their seminal paper and subsequent work, they showed that people
have asymmetric responses to risk, depending on whether the risk is
beneficial or detrimental. 123 For example, many people are risk averse
118. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
119. John T. Warner & Saul Pleeter, The Personal Discount Rate: Evidence from
Military Downsizing Programs, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 33 (2001) [hereinafter Warner &
Pleeter] (finding personal discount rates among members of the military to range between
zero and 30%).
120. Id. at 36 (citing Henry Ruderman, Mark Levine, & James McMahon, EnergyEfficiency Choice in the Purchase of Residential Appliances, in ENERGY EFFICIENCY:
PERSPECTIVES ON INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 36 (Willett Kempton & Max Neiman eds.,
1986); see also Uri Benzion, Ammon Rapoport, & Joseph Yagil, Discount Rates Inferred
from Decisions: An Experimental Study, 35 MGMT Sci. 270 (1989); Dermot Gatley,
Individual Discount Rates and the Purchaseand Utilization of Energy-Using Durables:
Comment, 11 BELL J. ECON. 373 (1980); Jerry A. Hausmann, Individual Discount Rates
and the Purchase and Utilization ofEnergy-Using Durables, 10 BELL J. EcON. 33 (1979).
121. Warner & Pleeter, supra note 119, at 47-48.
122. Cass Sunstein, Economics & Real People, 3 GREEN BAG 397, 398 (2000).
123. Their seminal work is Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman
& Tversky]. Their subsequent work constitutes: Rational Choice and the Framing of
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when it comes to gains, and risk loving when it comes to losses. 124 The
reasoning behind this is something called "loss-aversion."1' 25 Suppose
that an individual was offered the choice between a lottery that pays $0
or $100, with equal probabilities, or a certain sum of $50. I established
earlier that a risk-averse individual would prefer the certain sum of $50
to the lottery. 126 Now suppose that the individual was faced with the
choice of accepting a certain loss of $50 or the chance to play a lottery
with a chance to lose, with equal probability, $100 or $0. A rational,
risk-averse individual should take the certain loss of $50. Many
individuals, however, will choose the lottery. The reasoning is as
follows: since the individual is so averse to losing, the idea of losing $50
with certainty seems quite stressful. The lottery, on the other hand,
offers the person a chance to not lose any money. Hence, the individual
will choose the lottery so that he can have some chance of avoiding the
27
loss altogether.'
Figure 5(a) displays, graphically, the utility function of a risk-averse
individual, while Figure 5(b) shows the utility function for a risk-lover.
Utility is on the vertical axis, while income is on the horizontal axis. The
reader can see that I have chosen $100 as the initial income point. The
utility of $150 of certain income is higher than the expected utility from
either $100 or $200 (of uncertain income). Similarly, the utility of losing
$50 with certainty is higher than the chance of losing either $100 or $0
with equal probability. The risk-lover prefers the lottery in both
instances.

Decisions, 59 J. BUSINESS S251, S254-57 (1986); Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A
Reference Dependant Model, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1039 (1991); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992);

and, Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded

Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REv. 1449, 1455-58
(2003).
124. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 123, at 400.
125. Id.
126. See supra note 96.
127. Robert Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 35-40 (1989)
[hereinafter Ellickson].
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Figure 5

Figure 6 shows the utility function of the individual who is riskaverse to gains but risk-loving over losses.128 This means that they treat
the prospect of a gain from a gamble with great aversion, while they
approach losses with a cavalier attitude. These individuals are called
loss-averse. 129 The utility function looks like the letter S, and hence is
called an S-shaped utility function. The individual prefers to have $150
income rather than take his chances with the lottery, but will choose the
lottery over losing $50 with certainty.
Utiliry

income
$100

$150

$200

Fi~ure 6

128. Ellickson, supra note 127; see also Dacey, supra note 99.
129. David Dana, A New Social Scientific Assessment of Law and Human Behavior: A
Behavioral Economic Defense of the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 97 Nw. U.L. REV. 1315,
1321 (2003).
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Were juveniles to have S-shaped utility functions, the analysis
would be simple. Since punishment represents a loss, and crime gives
some gain, an individual who has an S-shaped utility function will
actually commit less crime than even a normally risk-averse individual.
The potential loss from a fine, jail time, or death would deter most
people from committing a crime because, in their minds, the potential
gain would not be worth the potential loss. An example, using
previously noted parameters, should prove to be instructive. 130 Suppose
an individual has an initial income of $10,000 and will gain $1000 from
committing a crime. If the individual is caught, which will occur with
probability 0.2, the fine will be f Now, suppose that for gains above
$10,000, this individual's utility function is risk-averse, but below the
initial income, the person's utility function is risk-loving. The expected
utility can be represented by
(10,000-f)
U = 0.8 x J/ll,000 +0.2x
1,000,000

2

In this case, a fine of only $1,000 is needed to deter, which is well below
the $3,500 that even a risk-averse individual would require to be
deterred.
Since juveniles, according to the AMA, are gain-loving, they can be
characterized as having reverse-S shaped utility functions. 3 1 Their
utility function is represented by Figure 7.

130. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
131. Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association et al. at 5-6, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633). The evidence from the experimental economics
literature supports this claim. See William T. Harbaugh, Kate Krause, & Lise Vesterlund,
Risk Attitudes of Children and Adults: Choices Over Small and Large Probability Gains
and Losses, 5 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 53 (2002) (arguing that juveniles are gain-loving and

not loss-averse).
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In Figure 7, the individual prefers the lottery when a gain is
involved, but prefers the certain loss to the chance of avoiding it. Crime
is typically random in its payoff. While the average robbery nets a thief
only $3000,132 there is always the potential for the million dollar heist.
The fact that there is a chance of being imprisoned does not seem to
matter. Since the juvenile is not loss-averse, the thought of losing does
not matter. An example is instructive. Suppose the individual has an
initial income of $10,000 and will gain $1000 from committing a crime.
If this individual is caught, which will occur with probability 0.2, the fine
will be f Now suppose that for gains above $10,000, this individual's
utility function is risk-loving but below the initial income it is riskaverse. The expected utility can be represented by
U =0.8x (11'000)
.2
10,000-f
1,000,000
Here the fine would have to be equal to or greater than $9800 to keep
this individual from committing the crime. This is quite a steep fine
compared to earlier results, and suggests that such an individual, who is
determined to commit a crime, will do so unless the punishment is steep.
Note, in contrast, that if the juvenile possesses a normal S-shaped
curve, the fine would only have to be set at $1,000 to deter, or $3,500 to
deter, were the juvenile is risk-averse. Even the risk-loving juvenile only
required a fine of $6,000. Removing the option to impose steep
132.

Warren St. John, Today's Bank Robber Might Look Like a Neighbor, N.Y.
at Al.

TIMES, July 3, 2004,
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penalties, including the death penalty, from the states will only result in
more juveniles engaging in crime. Simmons, for example, contemplated
the death penalty before he murdered a girl, believing that juveniles
could not be executed. 133 Had he correctly anticipated that the death
penalty applied to him, it could be assumed that he would not have
committed the murder.
C. Misperceivers of Probabilities
The last argument for why juveniles cannot be deterred is that
juveniles cannot "perceive and weigh risks and benefits accurately."
This is another observation that psychologists and economists have made
regarding all individuals, and not just juveniles. Again, Kahneman and
Tversky observed this many years ago. 134 They noticed that people overestimate small probability events and under-estimate large probability
events. 135 In the case of a juvenile deciding whether to commit a crime,
the probability in question is the probability of detection and conviction.
According to the research, the probability of detection and conviction for
many crimes is small. 136 If juveniles behaved the same as Kahneman and
Tversky's adults and over-estimated the probability of detection, then
this would indeed be nirvana for law enforcement authorities.' 37 States
would be able to deter a juvenile with a small fine or short jail sentence.
On the other hand, if juveniles actually do behave differently from adults
and underestimate small probability events, so that they were even more
myopic about the odds of escaping with their crimes, then the implication
would be that only harsher penalties would deter juveniles from
committing crimes.
Consider two risk-loving individuals, similar to the individual
analyzed above. 138 The first individual is a juvenile who correctly
perceives the probability of detection at 20%, while the second
individual is a juvenile who mistakenly believes that the probability of
detection is only 17.5%. The difference in the perceived odds of
detection is small, but the extra penalty needed to deter is very high. The
first individual requires a fine of $6,000 to be deterred, while the second
133.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005).

134. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 123, at 274-77.
135. Id.
136. Ehrlich, supra note 95, at 44-45. In 1991, the probability of imprisonment for
murder was 28.4%, for rape 5.2%, for robbery 3.6%, for aggravated assault 1.7%, for
burglary 1%, for larceny 0.8%, and for auto theft 0.4%. Id.
137. William S. Neilson, Probability Transformations in the Study of Behavior
Toward Risk, 135 SYNTHESE 171, 184 (2003) (arguing that even though the probability of
being audited for tax evasion is less than 2%, individuals are honest in their tax reporting
because they over-estimate the odds of being audited).
138. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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individual requires a fine of $9,100 to be deterred. If indeed juveniles
consider the odds of detection to be even lower than they are, the
implications are clear once again-harsher penalties are needed.
In all the scenarios presented above, the implications have been
consistent in regards to juveniles who possess the behavioral
characteristics set out by the majority in Roper. Namely, severe
punishment is needed to deter such juveniles. However, now that the
death penalty is no longer available to the states, juveniles will have less
to fear when committing crimes, and, therefore, will be less deterrable.
D. Will HigherPenalties Really Deter? A TheoreticalDetour
Many skeptics doubt that juveniles can be deterred. 139 Some
skeptics have even gone as far to call juvenile criminals "superpredators. 1 40 Many non-econometric studies,141 particularly those done
crime.141
by sociologists, claim to show that punishment does not deter
Their studies usually involve juvenile criminals who are either
interviewed or followed after being released from prison. 143 Those
interviewed claim that they will re-offend regardless of what punishment
awaits them, while those followed usually re-offend after being
released. 144 This, the skeptics claim, is proof that juveniles cannot be
deterred.1 45 I will present econometric evidence showing that juveniles
can indeed be deterred. First, however, I will discuss the basics of
deterrence.
Consider three juveniles who differ in their level of risk-tolerance.
The first is risk-averse, whose utility function is given by U = fx. The
second individual is risk-loving and has a utility function given by
U = x 1 5 . The third is also risk-loving, but loves risk even more than the
The most comprehensive study analyzing why juveniles cannot be deterred is
105-110 (1989) [hereinafter
Schneider]; see also Lee Michael Johnson, Ronald L. Simons, & Rand D. Conger,
Criminal Justice System Involvement ad Continuity of Youth Crime: A Longitudinal
Analysis, 36 YOUTH & SOCIETY 2 (2004) [hereinafter Johnson, Simons, & Conger]; Anne
L. Schneider & Laurie Ervin, Specific Deterrence, Rational Choice, and Decision
Heuristics:Applications in Juvenile Justice, 71 Soc. ScI. Q. 585 (1990). For a general
skeptical view of any deterrence effect of punishment see Paul H, Robinson & John M.
Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J.
LEG. STUD. 173, 200-02 (2004).
140. Levitt, supra note 27, at 1157 (citations omitted).
141. Econometrics is the statistical analysis of data. PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO
ECONOMETRICS 1-2 (3rd ed. 1992).
142. See Johnson, Simons, & Conger, supra note 139, and the studies cited therein.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Johnson, Simons, & Conger, supra note 139; Schneider, supra note
139, at 29-58.
145. Johnson, Simons, & Conger, supra note 139.
139.
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second individual, and has the utility function U = x 2 . Suppose all three

individuals have an initial income of $10,000, gain $1000 from
committing a crime, will be caught and convicted with probability 20%,
and will face a finef The fines needed to deter them each, respectively,
are $3,500 for the first individual (as shown above) 146; $4,800 for the
second individual; and, $6,000 for the third individual (also shown
above). 147 This shows that the more risk-loving the individual, the higher
the fine has to be to deter him or her. Suppose, for example, that the
maximum fine for a certain crime is $5000. The first two individuals
will not commit the crime, but the third person will. Now suppose that
the third person was apprehended and convicted. Unless the maximum
fine is above $5000, he will probably commit the same crime again.
Therefore, to say that punishment does not deter is false. It did deter the
first and second individuals, and would probably have deterred the third
if the fine had been above $5,000.
Suppose now that the maximum penalty is raised to $5,500. In this
case, the first and second individuals will still not offend. The third
individual will continue to commit his crime, because the fine has not
been raised high enough. This, however, does not evidence the lack of a
deterrent effect, but, rather, it shows that the penalty is not severe
enough. 148 So far, I have shown in my analysis that juveniles can be
deterred by higher penalties. If we observe that penalties are not having
a deterring effect on juveniles, then this is not necessarily evidence of
juveniles' irrationality and undeterrability. If anything, this is evidence
that society has not set the penalties high enough. Whether in fact we do
observe a lack of deterring effect on juveniles is the subject of the next
section where I will present the results of empirical studies regarding
juvenile crime and deterrence.
IV. Are Juveniles Rational Criminals? The Empirical Evidence
I will now introduce evidence of juvenile rationality and
deterrability. The evidence comes not from the medical or psychological
literature, but from economic studies. In sub-part A, I will discuss
whether juveniles can be deterred from committing crimes, while in subpart B, I will look at evidence regarding juvenile rationality and
economic decision-making. I will also look at other groups that have
been characterized as undeterrable, such as psychotics, drug addicts, and
the mentally ill.

146.
147.

See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.

148.

It could, of course, also show low probabilities of detection and conviction.
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The DirectEvidence

Before investigating whether punishment deters juveniles from
committing crimes, I will introduce some evidence that children are
rational in a very basic way. 149 The most basic test of rationality used by
economists is to determine whether an individual satisfies the axiom of
transitivity, which can be defined as follows: A is preferred over B and
B is preferred over C; this means that A is preferred over C. In other
words, if an individual is presented the option of choosing between
commodity A and B, the individual will choose A. 150 When presented
with the choice between B and C, the individual will choose B. 1 5' When
presented with the choice between A and C, the individual would
logically choose A. 152
Three economists investigated whether children were rational,
applying transitivity as a measure of rationality. 153 They conducted a
simple experiment where they asked several groups of children and
adults to choose between a variety of choices. 154 They conducted their
experiments on a group of second graders whose average age was seven,
a group of sixth graders whose average age was eleven, and a group of
undergraduates whose average age was twenty-one. They found that, in
all age categories, a portion of the group violated the transitivity axiom,
and, therefore, could be classified as irrational. 155 The seven-year-olds,
for the most part, behaved rationally. 15 6 However, a portion of them did
not. 57
The eleven-year-olds and twenty-one-year-olds behaved
rationally.15 What was revealing was that, while the proportion of
children who displayed irrational behavior dropped noticeably from the
seven-year-olds to the eleven-year-olds, there was no noticeable drop in
the proportion of irrationality from the eleven-year-olds to the twentyone-year-olds.1 59 In other words, by the age of eleven, children have
160
fully developed their basic cognitive skills for ranking preferences.
149. Gary Becker has argued that even if individuals are not rational, their aggregated
behavior will still be rational. Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic
Theory, 70 J. POL. EcON. 1, 12-13 (1962).
150. Binger & Hoffman, supra note 96, at 107.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. William Harbaugh, Kate Krause, & Timothy R. Berry, GARP for Kids: On the
Development of Rational Choice Behavior, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1539 (2001).
154. Id.
155.

Id. at 1543-44.

156.

Id.

157.
158.

Id.
Harbaugh, Krause, & Berry, supra note 153, at 1544.

159.

Id.

160.

Id. at 1545.
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Furthermore, the study showed that mathematical ability did not translate
into an ability to be rational, proving that rationality was a characteristic
developed through general experience and not something that
automatically results from possessing certain mental abilities.' 6 ' This
study is important, for if we are to take other studies seriously, we must
be somewhat satisfied that the subjects we are studying are behaving
according to one of the most basic axioms of economic behavior, namely
that of transitivity.
The economist Steven Levitt conducted the most direct study of
juvenile crime.' 62
In his ground-breaking study, Professor Levitt
examined the relationship between punishment and crime committed by
juveniles for the period 1978-1993.63 In his study, he found that
juveniles are deterred by punishment. 164 He also found that similar
165
punishments had similar effects on deterring juveniles and adults.
During his study, he observed that juvenile crime rates, especially violent
crime rates, had been rising faster than adult crime rates.' 66 He also
noted that juvenile punishment had fallen in severity by half during this
time period, while the severity of adult punishment had risen by over
60%.167 Using data from across the United States, Levitt was able to
study the relationship between the variation in punishment across states
and the rate of juvenile crime in those states.168
Levitt looked at the impact of the incarceration rate on the number
of crimes committed by juveniles. 169 He found that there was a
statistically significant negative relationship between the two
variables. 170 He estimated that for each delinquent incarcerated, there
was a reduction of between 0.49 and 0.66 violent crimes per year. 171 For
7
property crimes, the reduction was between three and four crimes.1 1
The adult custody rate was also negatively associated with the juvenile
violent crime rate, although it was positively associated with property
crimes. 173 Since juveniles who commit violent crimes may continue this
pattern of behavior in their adult life, juveniles who perceive that adults
receive harsher sentences for committing violent crimes would be less
161.

Id.

162.

Levitt, supra note 27.

163.
164.

Id. at 1160.
Id. at 1156.

165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1157.
Levitt, supra note 27, at 1165-66.

169. Id.
170. Id. at 1168.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1169-70.
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likely to commit violent crimes. 174 If adults are being harshly punished,
this lowers the return for adults who are committing crimes today.
Property crimes, on the other hand, do not seem to have this continuity
effect, i.e., juveniles associating harsh adult sentences for property
crimes with the likelihood that the same harsh sentences will apply to
them one day. Another interesting fact is that if adults are being
crimes, there are more property crime
incarcerated longer for property
175
juveniles.
for
opportunities
Levitt then examined the impact of punishment on adult crime. He
found that adding one more adult prisoner to the adult prisoner
population lowered adult violent crime by between 0.12 and 0.69 crimes
1 76
per year, and by between one and three property crimes per year.
Recall that juvenile violent crimes were reduced by between 0.49 and
0.66 per year and property crimes by between three and four in response
to one extra juvenile being incarcerated. 177 Punishment, therefore, has
an, equal, if not greater, deterring effect on juveniles than adults. This
suggests that juveniles have a more elastic demand for crime than adults
do and, it also calls into question the underlying assumptions of the
Roper decision.
Professor Levitt also investigated another aspect of juvenile crime.
He looked at how the relative harshness of adult punishment affected
crime rates of individuals as they transitioned from being juveniles to
adults.178 The age of majority is either eighteen or seventeen in most
states. 179 By examining the juveniles' response to adult punishments
upon reaching the age of majority, Levitt's analysis allows us to see if
juveniles below the age of eighteen are capable of conducting rational
cost benefit analysis at the age of seventeen. He found that as juveniles
transitioned into adulthood, no matter what the age of majority, crimes
committed by the new adults were negatively influenced by the relative
harshness of adult punishment.' 80 In states where adults were punished
far more severely than juveniles, when a juvenile reached the age of
majority, violent crimes and property crimes committed by those former

174. Levitt, supra note 27, at 1169-70.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1168.
177. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
178. Levitt, supra note 27, at 1171.
179. Id. at 1160. The age of majority actually varies from sixteen to nineteen, but
Levitt focuses on those states that have either the age of majority as seventeen or
eighteen, since they constitute most of the states. This can be seen from Table I of
Levitt's study, which shows that the mean age of majority is 17.5 with a standard
deviation of 0.7. Id. at 1165.
180

Id at 1174-75
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juvenile offenders dropped.1 81 In states where seventeen is the age of
majority, the new adults committed less violent crimes and less property
counterparts in those states where
crimes than their seventeen-year-old
82
the age of majority was eighteen.'
These results belie the claim that juveniles below the age of
eighteen are undeterrable and hence less culpable. It also points to the
futility of establishing an arbitrary age of eighteen as the age when a
person may be sentenced to death. Juveniles react just as rationally to
the incentives of punishment as adults do. Juveniles do not lack
rationality. What is lacking is punishment as severe as that meted out to
adults. Levitt concluded that the decline in the severity of juvenile
punishment explains the relative increase in juvenile crime. 83 In fact, he
estimated that 60% of the increase in juvenile crime could be attributed
to the drop in juvenile punishment.' 84 These results show that, by
prohibiting the use of the death penalty against juveniles, Roper will be a
further hindrance to states in their efforts to combat juvenile crime.
Other studies seem to confirm Levitt's results. For example, one
study looked at a sample of 16,478 high school children surveyed in
1995.185 This study had the advantage of looking at individual behavior
as opposed to aggregate crime rates, as in Levitt's article. The dataset
contained individual data on youth aged thirteen to seventeen from a
wide cross section of society. 86 The juveniles were asked a set of
questions as to whether they had committed certain crimes and how
frequently they had done so.' 87 The authors of the study then matched
this data with data on crime rates and arrest rates for violent crimes and
property crimes, for both adults and youth, in the county of residence of
the juveniles.1 88 The crime categories included selling marijuana,
assault, robbery, and burglary.' 89 The authors found that the arrest rates
negatively impacted the probability of juveniles selling drugs. 90
Specifically, they found that one additional arrest for a violent crime
181.
182.

Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1175-76.

183.

Levitt, supra note 27, at 1181.

184.

Id. at 1181.

185.

H. Naci Mocan & Daniel Rees, Economic Conditions, Deterrence and Juvenile

Crime: Evidence from Micro Data, 7 AM L. ECON. REv. 319, 323 (2005) [hereinafter
Mocan & Ress].
186. Id.
187. Id. at 324. Self-reported data always has its limitations, but the authors were
able to verify that the data conformed to other datasets that did not rely on surveys. Id. at
324 n.5.
188. The authors also looked at other variables as determinants of juvenile crime such
as religious beliefs, parental education, and unemployment rates. Id. at 337.
189. Id. at 324.
190. Id. at 337-38.
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1 91
reduced by 3.6% the probability that male juveniles would sell drugs.
In addition, for each violent crime arrest, the probability that male
juveniles would commit an assault was reduced by 6.6 % for each
arrest.192 However, robbery and burglary rates by males were not
responsive to violent crime arrest rates. 193 On the other hand, the number
of thefts and drug sales among female juveniles fell in response to
violent crime arrests. 194 Given that the death penalty is a tool aimed
primarily at the most violent of crimes, namely murder, the fact that male
juveniles committing assaults or selling drugs were responsive to violent
crime arrest rates suggests that a fortiori they would be very responsive
to the presence of the death penalty as a punishment.
What these studies show is that juveniles do respond to arrest rates
and punishment, especially for violent crimes, and that they respond, as
the Levitt study showed, by at least as much to punishment as adults do.
This suggests that if we can establish that the death penalty generally
deters individuals from committing murder, it could be implied that
juveniles will be equally deterred from committing murder.
Studies on the deterrent effect of the death penalty have been
conducted for many years. The first major study was conducted by
Thorsten Sellin, a sociologist, who used crude empirical methods to
arrive at the conclusion that capital punishment did not deter individuals
from committing homicides. 195 This idea seems to have been accepted
by many, 196 despite the number of studies that have now conclusively

191. Mocan & Rees, supra note 185, at 338.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 339.
194. Another study using experimental data also found that juveniles responded to
penalties. Michael Visser, Bill Harbaugh, & H. Naci Mocan, An Experimental Test of
Criminal Behavior Among Juveniles and Young Adults: GARP Among Thieves,
Another study
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/-mvisserl/GARP-among-thieves.pdf.
looked at 317 Chicago males whose average age was sixteen and who were sentenced to
prison for the first time. CHARLES MURRAY & Louis COX JR., BEYOND PROBATION:
The study
JUVENILE CORRECTIONS AND THE CHRONIC DELINQUENT 33-34 (1979).
concluded that prison served as a deterrent as the group's subsequent arrest rate fell by
two-thirds. Id. at 176-81.
195. THOMAS SELLIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMNET 135-54 (1967). For a critique of his
methodology, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 95, at 502-03.
196. See e.g. Helmut Kury, Theodore N. Ferdinand, & Joachim Obergfell-Fuchs,
Does Severe PunishmentMean Less Criminality? 13 INT'L CRIM. JUST. REV. 110 (2003);
James M. Galliher & John F. Galliher, A "Commonsense " Theory of Deterrence and the
"Ideology" of Science: The New York State Death Penalty Debate, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 307 (2002); Allan D. Johsnon, The Illusory Death Penalty: Why America's
Death Penalty Processfails to Support the Economics Theories of Criminal Sanctions
and Deterrence, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1101 (2001); Michael Radelet & Ronald L. Akers,
Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1996); Jonathan S. Abemethy, The Methodology of Death: Reexamining
the Deterrence Rationale, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.379 (1996).
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shown that the death penalty does deter against homicides. The first of
these studies was conducted by the economist Isaac Ehrlich who looked
at the homicide rate and its relationship to a variety of variables in the
United States during the period from 1933 to 1969.197 In his study, he
found that three variables negatively affected homicide rates in a
statistically significant manner.1 98 They were, in ascending order of
importance: the probability of arrest, the probability of conviction, and
the probability of execution. 99 He concluded that each additional
execution per year resulted in seven or eight fewer homicides each
year. 2 00 There were several methodological critiques of Ehrlich's
study, 20 1 and in response to these, Ehrlich re-did his study using crosssectional data for the various states during one or two time periods
only.2 °z He again found support for his conclusion that the death penalty
was a deterrent. 203 Following this set of work, a flurry of articles
followed, investigating the deterrence effect of capital
punishment; some
20 5
20 4
found a deterrence effect, while others did not.
197. Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrence Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life
and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397, 406 (1975).
198. Id. at413-14.
199. Id. at 409-12.
200. Id. at 414.
201. See e.g. Peter Passel & John B. Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment:Another View, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 445 (1977) (finding that when the period
of 1962-1967 was excluded due to virtual absence of the death penalty in those years, the
deterrence effect disappears).
202. Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence:Some Further Thoughts and
Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON., 741, 749 (1977) [hereinafter Ehrlich-Capital
Punishment]. For additional evidence on the deterrence effect of capital punishment, see
the following articles: Isaac Ehrlich, Deterrence,Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE L. J.
209, 225-27 (1975), The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Reply, 67 AM. ECON.
REV. 452 (1977), The Optimum Enforcement of Laws and the Concept of Justice. A
Positive Analysis, 2 INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 3, 14-16 (1982), supra note 95 at 62-63,
Isaac Ehrlich & J. Gibbons On the Measurement of the Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment and the Theory of Deterrence, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 35, 42-45 (1977);, and, Isaac
Ehrlich & Z. Liu, Sensitivity Analysis of the DeterrenceHypothesis: Let's Keep the Econ
in Econometrics, 42 J. LAW & ECON. 455, 484-86 (1996).
203. Ehrlich-Capital Punishment, supra note 202, at 779-81.
204. James A. Yunker, A New Statistical Analysis of Capital Punishment
IncorporatingU.S. PostmoratoriumData, 82 Soc. SCI. Q. 297, 310 (2001) (finding some
support for the deterrent effect of the death penalty); James Hennessy et. al, Crime and
Punishment: Infrequently Imposed Sanctions May Reinforce Criminal Behavior, 29
JOURNAL OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION 65, 73-74 (1999) (finding some support for

deterrence effect of death penalty); Samuel Cameron, A Review of the Econometric
Evidence on the Effects of CapitalPunishment, 23 J. Socio-ECON. 197 (1994) (explaining
why many studies show no deterrence effect and rebutting many of the claims that the
data show no impact of the death penalty); Steven Stack, Execution Publicity and
Homicide in South Carolina:A Research Note, 31 THE SOC. Q. 599 (1990) (finding a
drop in homicides after a publicized execution); George A. Chressanthis, Capital
Punishment and the Deterrent Effect Revisited: Recent Time Series Econometric
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The problem with all these studies, as economist Joanna Shepherd
has pointed out, is that the data is either aggregated nationally, which
prevents the researcher from looking at cross-state variations, or the data
is a cross-section of states during one time period, which prevents the
researcher from looking at trends over time.2 °6
To overcome these methodological problems, a new series of
articles have emerged where the researchers used pooled data. Pooled
data varies over time and comes from a cross-section of states. These
articles seem to all support the proposition that the death penalty has a
deterrent effect on homicides. For example, state-level data from 1978
onwards showed that the death penalty had a deterrence effect, with each
execution reducing the number of homicides per year by an average of
fourteen.2 0 7 Naci Mocan and Kaj Gittings also found a deterrence effect
Evidence, 18 J. BEHAVIORAL ECON. 81 (1989) (finding support for the deterrent effect
during the 1965-1985 time period); Steven Stack, Publicized Executions and Homicide,
1950-1980, 52 AM. Soc. REV. 532 (1987) (finding a drop of thirty homicides after each
publicized execution); James A. Yunker, Testing the Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: A Reduced Form Approach, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 626 (1982) (suggesting that
the capital punishment moratorium may have increased homicide rates); David P.
Phillips, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: New Evidence on an Old
Controversy, 86 AM. J. Soc. 139 (1980) (finding a drop in the homicide rate by 35.7%
after a publicized execution); James A. Yunker, Is the Death Penalty a Deterrent to
Homicide? Some Time Series Evidence, 5 J. BEHAVIORAL ECON. 45, 78-79 (1976)
(finding some evidence of a deterrent effect).
205. Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: D~ji vu
All Over Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 303, 327-28 (2005) (arguing that claims of
evidence of deterrence are a result of statistical anomalies); Jon Sorensen et. al, Capital
Punishment and Deterrence: Examining the Effect of Executions on Murder in Texas, 45
CRIME AND DELrNQUENCY 481 (1999) (no support for deterrence effect of death penalty in
Texas); William C. Bailey, Deterrence, Brutalization, and the Death Penalty: Another
Examination of Oklahoma's Return to Capital Punishment Bailey, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 711
(1998) (finding weak or no support for deterrence effect); John K. Cochran, Mitchell B.
Chamlin, & Mark Seth, Deterrence or Brutalization? An Impact Assessment of
Oklahoma's Return to CapitalPunishment, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 107 (1994) (no evidence of
deterrence effect); Jeffrey Grogger, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An
Analysis of Daily Homicide Counts, 85 J. AM. STAT. Ass'N 295 (1990) (finding no
evidence of drop in homicides following an execution); William Bailey & Ruth D.
Peterson, Murder and Capital Punishment: A Monthly Time-Series Analysis of Execution
Publicity, 54 AM. Soc. REv. 722 (1989) (taking issue with the Stack study and finding
that there is no or very little effect of the death penalty on homicides); Peter Passel &
John B. Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another View, 67 AM.
ECON. REv. 445, 450 (1977) (no effect); Stephen A. Hoenack & William C. Weiler, A
Structural Model of Murder Behavior and the CriminalJustice System, 70 AM. ECON.
REv. 327, 339 (1980) (no effect).
206. Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment's
Differing Impacts Among States, (forthcoming in MICH. L. REV.), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1000 &context-emorylwps.
Her
study contains a comprehensive citation to many other studies. Id. at 5-11.
207. Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder,
7 J. APPL. ECON. 163 (2004); see also Paul R. Zimmerman, Estimates of the Deterrent
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when they looked at state-level data from 1977-1997, estimating that
each execution reduced the number of homicides per year by five.2 °8
Additionally, they found that commuting death sentences increased the
murder rate. 20 9 Joanna Shepherd found that it did not matter that the
murder was a crime of passion or a murder by an intimate of another.21 0
These types of murders are usually claimed to be undeterrable. 1
However, these types of murders decreased in number when executions
took place.212 Shephard estimated that each execution decreased the
number of murders per year by three, while the passing of a death
sentence reduced the number of murders by 4.5213 She also found that,
as the waiting period on death row was reduced, the number of murders
decreased by one murder for every 2.75 years that the wait on death row
was reduced. 14 This last observation is consistent with the prediction of
economic theory, which would predict that the longer the time period
between arrest and execution for murder, the more criminals will
discount the cost of committing murder, resulting in the commission of
more murders. Another study found that 91% of those states that
suspended the death penalty, following the United States Supreme
Court's moratorium on execution from 1972 to 1976, faced an increase
in murder rates.2 15 In addition, 70% of the states that re-introduced the
death penalty after the moratorium saw a drop in murder rates.21 6 Using
county-level data for 3,054 counties during 1977-1996, three researchers
found that each execution reduced murders by eighteen, in all of the
counties as an aggregate.21 7 This data provides the strongest proof of the
deterrence effect of the death penalty, given the highly disaggregated
nature of the data used.
These and other studies concerning the deterrence effect of capital
Effect of Alternative Execution Methods in the United States: 1978-2000 (forthcoming
AM. J. ECON. & SOC.), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstractid=
355783.

208. H. Naci Mocan & Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences
and the Deterrent Effect of CapitalPunishment,46 J. L. ECON. 453 (2003).
209. Id.
210. Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion,Execution Delays, and the Deterrence
of CapitalPunishment,33 J. LEG. STUD. 283 (2004).
211. Id. at 284.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 308.
214. Id. at 283.
215. Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna Shepherd, The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: Evidence from a Judicial Experiment, working paper available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=432621 at 14.
216. Id. at 15.
217. Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul Rubin, & Joanna M. Shepherd, Does Capital
Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from PostmoratoriumPanel Data, 5
AM. L. ECON. REV. 344, 359, 369 (2003).
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punishment, 218 and punishment in general, 21 9 all point to the inescapable
218. See, e.g., Dale 0. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence:
A Quasi-ControlledGroup Experiment, 33 J. APPL. ECON. 569 (2001) (finding that the
Texas unofficial moratorium on executions during 1996 caused an increase in homicides
which fell after the moratorium was lifted); Ehrlich & Zhiqiang, supra note 203, at 48486; Liu Zhiqiang, Capital Punishment and the Deterrence Hypothesis: Some New
Insights and EmpiricalEvidence, 30 EAST. ECON J. 237 (2004) (finding strong support for
the deterrent effect of the death penalty).
219. There are numerous studies on the impact of punishment generally on crime.
Isaac Ehrlich (who investigated the death penalty as discussed in note 203 supra) looked
at robberies in the United States in 1940, 1950, & 1960. Isaac Ehrlich, Participationin
IllegitimateActivities: A Theoretical and EmpiricalInvestigations, 81 J. POL. ECON. 521,
559-61 (1973). He found that the higher the probability of conviction, the lower the
crime rate. Id. He also found no deterrent effect for the severity of punishment, as
measured by the length of the prison sentence for robbery, in the years 1940 and 1960,
but he did find a deterrence effect for the year 1950. Id. at 545. Subsequent studies
found support for the proposition that punishment does deter. See e.g. Lawrence Katz,
Steven D. Levitt, & Ellen Shustorovich, Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and
Deterrence, 5 AM. L. EcoN. REV. 318 (2003) (finding that death rates among inmates,
which can be thought of as an indicator of prison conditions, lowers both property and
violent crimes); Joanna Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of
California'sTwo-and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 159 (2002) (finding that
the three strikes legislation has a deterrent effect on crime); Jeff Desimone, The Effects of
Cocaine Prices on Crime, 39 ECON. INQUIRY 627 (2001) (finding that arrest rates have a
negative impact on most crimes); Hope Corman & H. Naci Mocan, A Time Series
Analysis of Crime, Deterrence, and Drug Abuse in New York City, 90 AM. ECON. REV.
584, 602 (2000) (finding strong support for the deterrence effect-specifically crimes
dropped in response to an increase in arrest rates); Steven D. Levitt, Why do Increased
Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime: Deterrence, Incapacitations, or Measurement
Error, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 353 (1998) (finding that increased arrests also deter against
additional criminal committing crime and do not simply incapacitate existing criminals);
Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from
Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q. J. ECON. 319 (1996) (finding that one extra
incarceration lowers the number of crimes committed each year by 15); Samuel Myers,
Estimating the Economic Model of Crime: Employment versus Punishment Effects, 98 Q.
J. ECON. 157 (1983) (finding a deterrent effect for severity of punishment); Ann Witte,
Estimating the Economic Model of Crime with Individual Data, 94 Q. J. ECON. 57 (1980)
(finding that severity of punishment had higher deterrent effect for violent criminals that
those committing property crimes); Kenneth Wolpin, An Economic Analysis of Crime
and Punishment in England and Wales 1894-1967, 86 J. POL. ECON. 815 (1978) (finding
that punishment deterred crime in England and Wales); DETERRENCE AND
INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES
336-424 (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen, & Daniel Nagin, eds., 1978); Alfred
Blumenstein & Daniel Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of Legal Sanctions on Draft Evasion,
29 STAN L. REV. 241, 242-43 (1977) (finding that higher penalties reduced draft evasion).
For a comprehensive survey of the literature, see Eide, supra note 95, at 359 ("The great
majority of correlation studies and cross-section regression analyses show a clear
negative association between punishment variables and the crime rate. Almost without
exception, the coefficients of the punishment variables ... are negative, and in most of
the cases significantly so."). An earlier survey by Eide of the literature can be found in
ERLING EIDE, ECONOMICS OF CRIME: DETERRENCE AND THE RATIONAL OFFENDER 247-48
(1994). An older but classic collection of theoretic and empirical studies on criminal
behavior is ECONOMIC MODELS OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 35-82, 153-210 (J.M. Heineke
ed., 1978).
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conclusion that the death penalty does deter, causing some prominent
legal scholars to claim that the death penalty is "morally required. 2 °
What it should also point to, for the purposes of this paper, is that the
death penalty will deter juveniles.
B.

The IndirectEvidence

The premise of the majority in Roper and the supporting amici
briefs was that juveniles could not be deterred since they lack rational
thought or, if they do possess rational thought, their rationality and
ability to calculate is clouded by certain myopic and euphoric
impulses. 22' These claims do not necessitate the abolition of the death
penalty for juveniles. As I argued earlier, these assertions would actually
necessitate the death sentence as a punishment for heinous crimes
committed by juveniles. 22 Nevertheless, the premise that juveniles lack
rational thought requires some empirical verification. I shall present
some of the empirical evidence regarding the rationality of children,
juveniles, and other so-called irrational members of society.
One of the best economic studies of juvenile behavior is the book
Risky Behavior Among Youths: An Economic Analysis.223 This book
contains a series of articles by eminent economists, examining various
aspects of risky youth behavior. What the studies found was that even
juveniles respond to economic incentives when engaging in risky
behavior. For example, in a study using data from 1991 to 1997, teen
smoking was found to be very responsive to cigarette prices.2 24 This
result is one of many in a series of studies that have shown that even
addiction can be economically rational.225
It had been a long-standing assumption that addicts, of any kind,
were undeterrable.22 6 Whether the addiction was to alcohol, tobacco, or
drugs, it was assumed that those addicted to these substances could not

220. Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermule, Is CapitalPunishmentMorally Required? The
Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 748-50 (2005); but see Carol
Streiker, No, Capital Punishment is not Morally Required: Deterrence,Deontology, and
the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 789 (2005).
221. See supra Part II.A.
222. See supra Part III.
223. RISKY BEHAVIOR AMONG YOUTHS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Jonathan Gruber
ed., 2001) [hereinafter RISKY BEHAVIOR).
224. Jonathan Gruber & Jonathan Zinman, Youth Smoking in the United States:
Evidence and Implications [hereinafter Gruber & Zinman]. RISKY BEHAVIOR, supra note
223, at 69.
225. See infra note 228.
226. Ole Skog, Addition, Choice and Irrationality, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (ed. Franseco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith date?).
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reduce their consumption.22 7 An implication of this assumption would be
that if the price of the addictive substance were to increase, the
consumption by the addict would not change. This is contrary to normal
consumer behavior where an increase in price would lead to a reduction
in quantity consumed. Economic studies, however, have shown the
contrary. These studies have shown that even addicts are rational, in that
they too change their behavior in response to price changes.2 28
Even the mentally ill act rationally. A study found that those with a
history of mental illness were more likely to consume alcohol, cigarettes,
and cocaine than individuals with no mental illness. 229 The study,
however, also found that the mentally ill individuals were priceresponsive. 230
Even forty-four female psychotics (primarily
schizophrenics) in a mental institution were found to act rationally.231
They each performed about an hour of work, such as laundry and
cooking, when rewarded for their performance.232 However, when they
were not rewarded, regardless of task performance, the patients
eventually did not perform at all.233
Returning to smoking juveniles, a study looked at juvenile smoking

227. Id.
228. The key article positing a theory of rational addiction was by Gary S. Becker &
Kevin M. Murphy. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational
Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675 (1988). Empirical confirmation of their theory can be
found in Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, An Empirical Analysis of Cigarette
Addiction, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 396 (1994). See also Jenny Williams, Habit Formation
and College Students'Demandfor Alcohol, 14 HEALTH ECON. 119, 131-32 (2005); Ziggy
MacDonald, What Price Drug Use? The Contribution of Economics to an EvidenceBased Drugs Policy, 18 J. ECON. SURVEYS 113, 143-47 (2004); Mikael Bask & Maria
Melkersson, Rationally Addicted to Drinking and Smoking, 36 APPL. ECON. 373 (2004);
Jonathan Gruber & Botond Koszegi , Is Addiction 'Rational'?Theory and Evidence, 116
Q. J. ECON. 1261 (2001); Frank J. Chaloupka & Kenneth Warner, The Economics of
Smoking in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1539 (Anthony Culyer & Joseph
Newhouse eds., 2000); Michael Grossman, Frank J. Chaloupka, & Richard Anderson, A
Survey of Economic Models of Addictive Behavior, 28 J. DRUG ISSUES 631 (1998);
Samuel Cameron, Are Greek Smokers Rational Addicts, 4 APPL. ECON. LETTERS 401
(1997); Jan C. van Ours, The Price Elasticity of Hard Drugs: The Case of Opium in the
Dutch East Indies, 1923-1938, 103 J. POL. ECON. 261, 278-79 (1995); Gary S. Becker,
Habits, Addictions and Traditions, 45 KYKLos 327, 333 (1992); Frank J. Chaloupka,
RationalAddictive Behaviorand CigaretteSmoking, 99 J. POL. ECON. 722 (1991).
229. Henry Saffer & Dhaval Dave, Mental Illness and the Demand for Alcohol,
Cocaine,and Cigarettes,43 ECON. INQUIRY 229 (2005).
230. Id.
231. T. Ayllon & N.H. Azrin, The Measurement and Reinforcement of Behavior of
Psychotics, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR 357 (1965) [hereinafter Ayllon &
Azrin]. In another study, animals were also found to act rationally. JOHN H. KAGEL,
RAYMOND

C.

BATTALIO,

& LEONARD GREEN,

ECONOMIC CHOICE

EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 200-06 (1995).
232. Ayllon & Azrin, supra note 23, at 357-62.
233. Id. at 381-82.
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behavior using experimental methodology and confirmed that increases
in cigarette price will negatively impact juvenile cigarette
consumption.2 34 Marijuana use by juveniles was also found to be price
sensitive. 235std
Another study found that cocaine addiction by high school
seniors also fit the rational addiction model, showing that the demand for
2 6 In addition, alcohol consumption
cocaine was price sensitive. 236
by the
same group was found to be price sensitive.237
Even non-consumption risky behavior was found to be responsive
to incentives. Teenage pregnancies, for example, fell as welfare benefits
fell (thereby reducing the payoff for an out-of-wedlock child). 238 Nonprice variables also affect risky teenage behavior. For example, teenage
pregnancies declined as the incidence of AIDS increased.239
Another study found that juveniles did respond to legal variables.
For example, minimum legal drinking ages reduced underage drinking.24 °
Similarly, minimum smoking ages reduced underage teenage smoking,241
and mandatory seat belt laws reduced vehicle fatalities among youth.242
In contrast, those activities that did not have an age specific legal
restriction, such as smoking marijuana, did not have an age specific
pattern for youth.24 3
Overall, the econometric evidence points to the proposition that
even juveniles are rational, responding to incentives in a consistent and
measurable manner. This further suggests that juveniles can be deterred.
V.

What Do These Theoretic and Empirical Results Mean for the
Death Penalty and Other Forms of Punishment?

Given that capital punishment has existed in America since its
founding, and given that there is a large body of work that suggesting
that capital punishment will deter, it seems curious that the Supreme
234.

Hana Ross et. al, New Evidence on Youth Smoking Behavior Based on

ExperimentalPrice Increases, 23 CONTEMPORARY ECON. POLICY 195 (2005).
235. Rosalie L. Pacula et. al, Marijuana and Youth [hereinafter Pacula], in RISKY
BEHAVIOR AMONG YOUTHS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 271 (Jonathan Gruber ed., 2001).

236.

Michael Grossman & Frank J. Chaloupka, The Demandfor Cocaine by Young

Adults: A RationalAddiction Approach, 17 J. HEALTH ECON. 427 (1998).

237. Michael Grossman, Frank J. Chaloupka, & Ismail Sirtalan, An Empirical
Analysis of Alcohol Addiction: Results from the Monitoring the Future Panels, 36 ECON.
INQUIRY 39 (1998).

238.

Phillip B. Levine, The Sexual Activity and Birth-Control Use of American

Teenagers. RISKY BEHAVIOR, supra note 223, at 187.

239.
240.

Id. at213.
Phillip J. Cook & Michael J. Moore, Environment and Persistence in Youthful

Drinking Patterns. RISKY BEHAVIOR, supra note 223, at 375.

241.
242.

243.

Gruber & Zinman, supra note 224, at 117-19.
RISKY BEHAVIOR, supra note 223, at 121.
Pacula, supra note 235, at 317-19.
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Court would have deprived the states a longstanding tool in their arsenal
against juvenile crime. Those who seek to restrict the ability of states to
fashion their own policies for controlling crime within their boundaries
should bear the burden of showing that the death penalty was ineffective
in deterring both juveniles and adults. One wonders if the result might
have been different in Roper had economists filed an amicus brief
showing that juveniles can indeed be deterred.
The policy implications of this paper are clear. There is no reason
why states should not be allowed to apply whatever penalties they feel
are necessary to deter juveniles from crime. In fact, states may need to
treat juveniles with harsher modalities of punishment than adults if
juveniles are indeed risk-takers who underestimate their chances of being
caught and who place a higher emphasis on present gratification than
adults do. Some have suggested that since the juvenile penalties are so
low, as compared to adult penalties, many police departments do not
invest in the resources needed to combat juvenile crime.244 This is
unfortunate. If low penalties mean less policing, then this amplifies the
message that it is acceptable for juveniles to commit crimes.
A frequent criticism of the justice system today is the delay between
arrest and conviction of criminals. Even a risk-averse individual with
normal discount rates may decide to commit a crime if the delay in
penalty is large enough. If juveniles are even hastier than adults are, a
punishment mechanism that allows for immediate punishment must be
found. There are also preventative measures that may help. Night
curfews for youth are one example. An enforceable curfew for juveniles
would serve two purposes. First, a curfew will lower youth exposure to
the negative peer pressure that leads many to a life of crime. Second, by
punishing curfew-breakers, it sends a message that society is serious
about law and order. It can also teach them that breaking the law is
unacceptable. In addition, I would suggest that the penalty for violating
the curfew be severe. The severity will send a message, showing
society's disapproval of young men and women roaming around in
search of the illicit. It will also serve as a deterrent to violent crimes. If
violating a simple curfew will yield a harsh reaction, juveniles may likely
fear the repercussions of committing a violent crime.
The types of punishments for youth must also be re-considered. If
indeed they respond to present and immediate stimuli more than
promised events in the future, then the immediacy of punishment is
necessary. One proposal is to allow state corporal punishment for those
juveniles who are engaging in suspicious activities.245 Youth who are
244.

Levitt, supra note 27, at 1175 n.17.

245.

Such punishments were once common for adults and youth alike in America,
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arrested under highly suspicious circumstances, which would normally
give an office probable cause to arrest them for violent crimes, could
immediately receive some form of corporal punishment (with the
appropriate judicial supervision). This may impress upon them, by way
of their amygdala, the severity of their actions, if indeed the amygdala is
where juveniles react from. It may happen, that an innocent juvenile is
punished and is then released or later acquitted. In such an instance, the
state could compensate the juvenile for the wrongful punishment. But,
the message would be clear: violent activity will not be tolerated.
Sending such a message will help juveniles recognize that committing
heinous crimes is morally and socially unacceptable. In fact, sending a
message is even something the skeptics of the deterrent effect of
punishment for juveniles have argued is one of the few factors that
reduce juvenile crime.24 6
Professor Kontorovich has called this idea a liability rule of
constitutional rights. 241
He argued that under certain urgent
circumstances, the states should be allowed to engage in protective
measures that may violate certain individual's rights. 248 Rather than a
property rule that enjoins the state from carrying out its protective
measures, the rule should be a liability rule whereby some compensation
is paid out. 249

Society would be protected and those wrongfully

aggrieved would be compensated.25 ° I would argue for a similar
application in the case of juveniles suspected of committing crimes. In
Roper, Mr. Simmons's trial, conviction, sentencing, and direct appeal
occurred many years after his arrest.25 1 In the intervening time, had he
been subject to hard labor, caning, or some other harsh punishment, the
message that youth violence will not be tolerated would be loud and
clear.
In the event that he would be acquitted, a measure of

England, and Europe. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON 3-69 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1995). See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 74-75 (1993); CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, THE ENGLISH:
A SOCIAL HISTORY 1066-1945 239 (1987) [hereinafter Hibbert].

246. Schneider & Ervin, supra note 139, at 585. For the idea that laws can shape
individual's preferences, see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economics Analysis of the
CriminalLaw as a Preference-ShapingPolicy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 38 (1990).
247. Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of
Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755 (2004) [hereinafter Kontorovich]. Professor
Kontorovich argues that we already have liability rules for constitutional rights. Eugene
Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis of
ConstitutionalRemedies (forthcoming 91 VA. L. REv. 1135, 1197-98 (2005)).
248. Kontorvich, supra note 247, at 779-813.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. He was arrested in 1993, and by the time his first appeal was over, it was 1997.
State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. 1997).
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compensation could be paid out to him for having been wrongly
punished. However, his punishment would have served its purpose, by
sending a message to other juveniles who were contemplating
committing a heinous crime. While the state could lose some money
from paying out compensation, society would be better off due to the
reduced crime rate.
The idea of escalating penalties is not new or novel. Professor
David Dana has argued that, especially for regulatory offenses, we
should punish first time offenders more severely than when the same
offender subsequently re-offends. 2 The probability of detection for a
first-time offender is low, but the probability of detection for repeat
offenders increases. 3 Hence, economic theory dictates that the first
offense should be punished most severely, since that is what is needed to
deter, while repeat offenders can easily be deterred by lower
punishments.
Similarly, Gary Becker in his analysis of the economics of illegal
goods (such as drugs) concludes that it may be socially optimal to punish
"smaller, younger, and weaker suppliers" more heavily than bigger and
more efficient producers.25 4 Punishing drug couriers, who are usually
poor and themselves addicted to drugs, more severely than the organized
crime leader may indicate the presence of corruption in the criminal
justice system that punishes the poor drug couriers more harshly than the
kingpins. 5 However, Becker argues that punishing the drug couriers
more harshly than the kingpins may also be a sign of socially optimal
levels of enforcement. 6
This is because targeting the efficient
producers does not deter much, while targeting the less efficient
producers has a greater impact on the overall supply of drugs.2 57
Juveniles may perceive the odds of detection as lower than what they
really are. 8 Therefore, higher penalties are needed to deter them. The
novelty of Becker's analysis also aids in thinking about juvenile
punishment. If juveniles are indeed hapless, helpless, impressionable,
and unable to calculate the costs and benefits of their crimes, then they
are similar to Becker's small, young, and weak drug suppliers.
252. David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat
Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 783 (2001).
253. Id. at 742.
254. Gary S. Becker, Kevin M. Murphy, & Michael Grossman, The Economic Theory
of Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs 24, NBER, working paper 10976, available at
http://home.uchicago.edu/-gbecker/illegalgoodsBecker_-GrossmanMurphy.pdf at 2425.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, it would be more efficient to punish juveniles more severely
than their adult counterparts.
Lest the reader forget, my recommendations are premised on
juveniles behaving as, characterized by the majority, the AMA, and the
APA in Roper.25 9 The empirical evidence, though, seems to suggest that
juveniles may behave as rationally as adults do. If that is true, then my
drastic solutions are not needed. All that is needed is the flexibility for
the states to tailor their policies as they see fit.
VI. Culpability and Our Attitude Towards Juveniles
So far, I have dealt with the question of deterrence. The question of
culpability was premised on the same assumptions that the majority in
Roper used to justify the lack of any deterrence for juveniles. If the same
qualities attributed to juveniles by the Roper court lead to both
diminished culpability and decreased deterring effect, then the
assumption of diminished culpability must also be brought into question.
The empirical evidence, however, has shown that juveniles can be
deterred. 260 This puts into doubt the very assumptions upon which the
majority rested its case for diminished culpability for juveniles.
Historically, in criminal matters, juveniles and adults were treated
equally in England, although by the 1300s, notions of maturity began to
take hold in criminal law. 261 By the time of Blackstone, the law had
broken juveniles into three categories. Under the age of seven, no child
was presumed to have any mental capacity to tell right from wrong and
hence, could not be guilty of a crime, much less executed for committing
one. 262 Above the age of fourteen, which was deemed to be the age of
puberty, all juveniles were presumed to be able to distinguish between
right and wrong and could be subject to execution.263 Children between
the ages of seven and ten, who were adjudged to have been able to
distinguish between good and evil at the time they committed the crime,
were also subject to the death penalty. 26
It should be noted that the emphasis at common law was on whether
the child could distinguish between right and wrong, and not whether
259. See supra Parts II.A & B.
260. See supra notes 162-185.
261. Sanjeev Anand, Catalyst for Change: The History of Canadian Juvenile Justice
Reform, 24 QUEEN'S L.J. 515, 517-18 (1999). Two classic articles that deal with the
history of punishments for juveniles are A.W.G. Kean, The History of the Criminal
Liability of Children, 53 L.Q. REv. 364 (1937) and Victor L. Streib, Death Penaltyfor
Children: The American Experience with Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed
While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 613 (1983).
262. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 4 23-25.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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they had an impulsive behavior caused by lack of development.26 5 For
example, children younger than seven and the mentally ill, not including
the mentally retarded, were excused for lacking the ability to
discriminate between right and wrong.266 Culpability, therefore, always
rested on the question of whether the individual could distinguish right
from wrong. Therefore, effectiveness of punishment rather than
culpability is the proper tool for analyzing deterrence. The Supreme
Court conflated the two concepts and essentially mixed what was needed
to prove one with what was needed to prove the other. The AMA,
however, did answer the question of juvenile culpability when it stated
that juveniles can distinguish between right and wrong.26 7
Assuming that the ability to engage in proper cost-benefit
calculations is the correct yardstick to measure culpability, the Supreme
Court has begun to travel down a dangerous path towards changing the
standard by which culpability is measured. The Court seems to have
been dazzled by the array of medical evidence that the AMA and others
presented in their amici briefs. The evidence claimed to show that the
brains of juveniles are not as developed as those of adults.2 68 This
medical evidence, the AMA claimed, was conclusive in showing that
juveniles could not properly engage in calculating the costs and benefits
of their crimes. 269 The AMA argued that recent imaging studies of
juvenile brains have shown that their "frontal lobes are still structurally
Yet, as one researcher has
immature well into late adolescence, 2 7
pointed out, 271 many adults, such as drug addicts 272 and violent adult
265.

dissenting).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340 (2002) (Scalia, J.,

266.
267.

Id.
Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association at 5, Roper, (No. 03-633);

209 (1880) (reversing the capital conviction of an
see also Angelo v. People, 96 Ill.

eleven year old because the prosecution did not establish that the child could tell right
from wrong).
If this was true, and the evidence tended to prove it, the rule required
evidence strong and clear beyond all doubt and contradiction, that he
was capable of discerning between good and evil; and the legal
presumption being that he was incapable of committing the crime, for
want of such knowledge, it devolved on the People to make the
strong and clear proof of capacity, before they could be entitled to a
conviction.
Id. at 212.
268. Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association at 16-20, Roper, (No. 03633).
269. Id. at 5.
270. Id. at 18.
271. Ronald Bailey, Bad Brains: How the Supreme Court's Teen Execution Decision
Proves Too Much, Reason Online March 23, 2005, http://www.reason.com/rb/
rb032305.shtml [hereinafter Bailey].
272. Bailey, supra note 271 (citing Dan I. Lubman, Murat Yiicel & Christos Pantelis,
Addiction, a Condition of Compulsive Behavior? Neuroimaging and Neuropsychological
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psychopathic criminals, also have underdeveloped frontal lobes.273
I noted earlier that pedophiles can also have highly impulsive
behavior, and in fact, can also be characterized by neurobiological
traits. 274 In addition, researchers claim that the Zodiac killer, who
terrorized the citizens of California, actually suffered from "multiple
personality disorder., 275 Men who kill their spouses, whom they believe
are about to leave, also have common neurobiological characteristics,
according to a researcher who claimed to have established that "evidence
has accumulated for a neurobiological link between abandonment and
homicidal rage. 276 Interestingly, the author conceded that his study
"should not be read as an attempt to remove the contextual features from
intimate rage. . .,"277 a point also conceded by another researcher who
studies violent behavior.278
Even gambling, kleptomania, and
compulsive buying have been attributed to the chemical composition in
the brain. 279 Rape has been observed in individuals suffering from brain
280
injuries suggesting a medical aspect to "sexually intrusive behavior."
One study found that racism may have its roots in the amygdala, which281
is
the region of the brain juveniles receive their impulsive anger from.
There was noticeable activity in the amygdala region of subjects who
were shown faces from races different from theirs. 282 However, the
study found that such racism could be overcome by the individual's
attitude towards race, shown by the fact that those subjects who held
283
non-stereotypical views did not show any activity in the amygdala.
Evidence of InhibitoryDysregulation, 99 ADDICTION 1491 (2004)).
273. Bailey, supra note 271 (referring to Adrian Raine et. al, Reduced Prefrontal
Gray Matter Volume and Reduced Autonomic Activity in Antisocial PersonalityDisorder,
57 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 119 (2000)); see also Nora Volkow et. al, Brain Glucose
Metabolism in Violent Patients: a PreliminaryStudy, 61 PSYCHIATRY RES. 243, 250-52

(1995).
274.

Cohen & Galynker, supra note 117, at 281.

275. MICHAEL D. KELLEHER & DAVID VAN Nuys, THIS IS THE ZODIAC SPEAKING: INTO
THE MIND OF A SERIAL KILLER 231 (2002).

276. Donald G. Dutton, The Neurobiology of Abandonment Homicide, 7 AGGRESSION
& VIOLENT BEHAV. 407 (2002).
277. Id. at 418.
278. Peter Fonagy, Towards a Developmental Understandingof Violence, 183 BRIT.
J. PSYCHIATRY 190, 191 (2003) ("Such [biological] evidence does not preclude the

relevance of social environment.").
279. Jon E. Grant & Marc N. Potenza, Impulse Control Disorders: Clinical
Characteristics and Pharmacological Management, 16 ANNALS OF CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY 27 (2004).
280. Scott C. Bezeau, Sexually Intrusive Behavior Following Brain Injury:
Approaches to Assessment and Rehabilitations, 18 BRAIN INJURY 299 (2004).

281.

Mary E. Wheeker & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice: Social-

Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation, 16 PSYCH. SCI. 56 (2005).

282.
283.

Id. at 61-62.
Id.
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The point of providing the results of these studies is to show that
juveniles suffer from the same cerebral shortcomings as the most violent
criminals. Surely, no one would suggest that drug addicts, violent thugs,
pedophiles, serial killers, jealous husbands who murder their wives,
gamblers, thieves, and racists should be less culpable for any crimes they
may commit because of undeveloped areas of their brain. Therefore, it
makes no sense to consider juveniles less culpable if the reason they
commit violent crimes is the same reason violent adults commit crimes.
The idea of medical pre-dispositions can also be applied to gender
differences. One researcher has argued that men and women have
fundamentally different brains. 284

Males are systematizers who try to

identify the laws that govern a system, 285 while females are empathizers
who recognize that others have feelings and who respond with
appropriate emotions.28 6 He cites the lack of empathy in males as
evidence for why males may be more aggressive.287 His claims may be
validated by other studies, 288 but the consequences of his claims, applied
to the logic of Roper, would be absurd. Males would be less culpable
than females because males lack the ability to empathize to the same
degree as females and because they take more risks than females.
Females, on the other hand, would be quickly and severely condemned
for committing crimes. The battered women syndrome defense would be
turned on its head!
Curiously, none of these medical findings regarding adult criminals
have had much success as an insanity defense. 289 The law has strongly
resisted the ever-growing Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders' ("DSM") list of mental diseases as a basis for acquittals.290
Yet, for juveniles, the Supreme Court seemed willing to dispense with
years of practice based on recently imaged juvenile brains, which purport
29 1
to show that juveniles lack the maturity to be deterred by punishment.

284. SIMON BARON-COHEN, THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE
MALE AND FEMALE BRAIN 1-12 (2003).

285. Id. at 61-68.
286. See id. at 29-60.
287. Id. at 36.
288. One economic study did find that women were more risk averse than men. See
generally Nancy Ammon Jianakopolos & Alexandra Bernasek, Are Women More Risk

Averse?, 36 ECON.

INQUIRY

620 (1998).

289. A search of cases will not reveal any cases that have accepted such arguments as
a reason for acquitting an accused killer or aggressor. A good (but dated) survey of the
insanity defense and the reluctance of the law to adopt the latest medical evidence is
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 143-228 (1994).

290. The list of mental diseases can be found at http://www.psychologynet.org/
dsm.html (last visited ????). A search of the case law shows that few (or no?) courts
have accepted these mental diseases as an insanity defense.
291. Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association et al., Roper v. Simmons,
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Medical researchers would all agree that environmental factors
could be relevant for individuals who may have a genetic pre-disposition
to contract cancer or diabetes. 292 However, doctors routinely advise us
that a healthy diet and adequate exercise can prevent cancer and diabetes,
despite a genetic predisposition. Now consider if an individual with a
genetic predisposition for contracting diabetes consumed copious
quantities of sweets every day and neglected to exercise. We would
likely blame the individual's lifestyle as the reason they contracted
diabetes. The person had a genetic predisposition for diabetes, meaning
that the need to avoid an unhealthy diet was even higher than someone
293
without such a genetic predisposition.
Recall that the researchers, who claimed to have found medical
reasons for violence, also conceded that environmental factors
contributed to the incidence of violence.2 94 Moreover, just as no one
would sympathize with the sugar-consuming diabetic, we should not
allow the medical reasons for juvenile behavior to take away from their
culpability. Sugar-consuming diabetics should take responsibility for
their own behavior, as should juveniles who contemplate engaging in
criminal activity.
The medical profession, like any other profession, seeks to
maximize its influence over society in order to maximize returns to its
members. This statement should not be controversial, and is consistent
with the theory of special interest groups.2 95 The medical profession, in
an attempt to have a wider affect on society has analyzed many aspects
of society and societal behavior through a medical point of view. 296 It is

not surprising, therefore, to see the AMA wade into the question of
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) at 10.
292. Alice H. Lichtenstein & Robert M. Russell, Essential Nutrients: Food or

Supplement? Where Should the Emphasis Be?, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 351, nn.l-125
(2005) (citing 125 studies that have looked at the impact of diet on disease).
293. For an excellent discourse on how genetic and environmental determinism is
complemented by self-determinism by all organisms, see RICHARD C. LEWONTIN,
BIOLOGY As IDEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF DNA 107-123 (1993).

294. See, e.g., supra notes 277-83.
295. The theory of special interest groups was developed by the economist Mancur
Olson, whose work provided insight into how small but organized special interest groups
can impose their agenda on the public. MANCUR OLSON, LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 22-57 (1965).

296. For example, doctors have commented on gun control. See, e.g,. David C.
Grossman et. al, Gun Storage Practices and Risk of Youth Suicide and Unintentional
Firearm Injuries, 293 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 707 (2005); Garen J. Wintemute et. al,
Subsequent Criminal Activity Among Violent Misdemeanants Who Seek to Purchase
Handguns: Risk Factors and Effectiveness of Denying Handgun Purchase, 285 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 1019 (2001). For a critique of the American Medical Association's gun
control politics, see MIGUEL A. FARIA, JR., MEDICAL WARRIOR: FIGHTING CORPORATE
SOCIALIZED MEDICINE (1997).
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juvenile executions. In its quest to gain dominion over more American's
lives, the National Institute for Mental Health now claims that almost
half of Americans are, or will become, mentally ill. 297 Listing such
diseases as female sexual disorder and passive-aggressive disorder as
mental illnesses, 298 it is a wonder that anyone is still culpable for their
crimes.
It is unfortunate that the majority (and the minority) in Roper did
not take a skeptical look at the amici briefs. Had economists presented
their empirical findings in a brief, the majority would have been forced
to ask the hard question of whether the science behind the AMA is even
valid in the first place. All that the studies show is that there are some
medical patterns associated with juveniles' brains, 299 but no concrete
causal relationships between juveniles' brains and their behavior have
been established.3 °°
The science of mental diagnoses is ephemeral and volatile, as seen
by the contradictory positions taken by the medical profession over the
years. For example, it was also once believed that masturbation caused
schizophrenia. 30 1 The DSM manual, which Justice Kennedy relied on,
once classified homosexuality as a mental disease. 30 2 It is curious how
the science, which justified including such information in a medical
manual, changed so dramatically in a few years that this same
information was completely removed from the next edition of the

297. Jamie Talan, Halfare Mentally ill, 16 ScI. AM. MIND 9 (2005).
298. See http://www.psychnet-uk.com/dsm iv/misc/completetables.htm.
299. Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability,and the Adolescent Brain, 305 SCIENCE 596,
599 (2004) [hereinafter Beckman].
Although many researchers agree that the brain, especially the frontal lobe,
continues to develop well into teenhood and beyond, many scientists hesitate to
weigh in on the legal debate. Some, like Giedd, say the data "just aren't there"
for them to confidently testify to the moral or legal culpability of adolescents in
court. Neuroscientist Elizabeth Sowell of UCLA says that too little data exist
to connect behavior to brain structure, and imaging is far from being diagnostic.
"We couldn't do a scan on a kid and decide if they should be tried as an adult,"
she says.
ld; see also Michael McGough, 'My Brain Made Me Do It'; What Happens to Guilt and
Innocence When an MRI Can Tell You Whols Likely to Commit a Violent Crime?, PITT.
POST-GAZ., June 6, 2005, at B7 (quoting Professor Stephen J. Morse, a professor of law
and psychology at the University of Pennsylvania, who stated that "we have no idea how
the brain enables the mind").
300. Beckman, supra note 299, at 599.
301. E. FULLER TORREY, SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA: A MANUAL FOR FAMILIES,
CONSUMERS, AND PROVIDERS 168 (2001).
302. HERB KUTCHINS & STUART K. KIRK, MAKING US CRAZY: DSM: THE PSYCHIATRIC
BIBLE AND THE CREATION OF MENTAL DISORDERS 55 (1997); see also BIAS IN
PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS 71-148 (Paula J. Caplan & Lisa Cosgrove eds., 2004)
(demonstrating that many of psychiatric diagnoses in DSM are marred by race, age,
income, and other biases).
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DSM.3 °3 If this is the pace of scientific progress, then what faith can we
have in the science behind the AMA's brief? Is this science the sort of
foundation the Supreme Court should rest its legal conclusions upon?
The legal conclusion that it is unconstitutional to execute juveniles now
binds every state in the nation and has denied the states a valuable
instrument of law enforcement. Juvenile executions were the norm in
this nation for over two centuries. The Supreme Court, therefore, should
have demanded stronger evidence before judging the practice
unconstitutional.
It is not surprising, however, to see the Supreme Court's ruling in
Roper. Our society has been moving away from the days when children

were charged with responsibilities and given few privileges.

At the

founding of this nation, it was not uncommon for men under twenty to
have already started their careers.3 °4
It was only in the nineteenth century that juveniles began to receive

303. William R. Metcalfe & Paula J. Caplan, Seeking "Normal" Sexuality on a
Complex Matrix, BIAS INPSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS 123 (Paula J. Caplan & Lisa Cosgrove
eds., 2004).
304. Consider, for example, the following founding fathers. Elbridge Gerry
graduated from Harvard at age eighteen and then joined his father's business. M.E.
BRADFORD, FOUNDING FATHERS: BRIEF LIVES OF THE FRAMERS OF THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION 6 (1994). Caleb Strong was nineteen when he graduated from Harvard
and started his career. Id. at 12. Roger Sherman was forced by his father's death to start
his career at age twenty. Id. at 22. William Samuel Johnson earned his B.A. at seventeen
and his M.A. at twenty, and was a member of the bar at twenty-two. Id. at 29. Alexander
Hamilton enrolled at King's College (now Columbia University) at age sixteen, but left
for service in the military in 1776 at the age of nineteen. Id. at 40-41. Robert Yates was
twenty-two when admitted to the bar, and John Lansing was only twenty-one. Id. at 49,
51. Jonathan Dayton who was the youngest of the framers of the Constitution, was only
sixteen when graduated from the College of New Jersey, and was captain in the
Continental army by the age of nineteen. Id. at 61. Benjamin Franklin apprenticed with
his father at the age often, only to go on at age twelve and learn the printer's trade. Id. at
64-65. He started as a printer on his own at age seventeen and traveled to London where
he also worked as printer at eighteen. Id. Robert Morris apprenticed in his early teens at
a countinghouse, while Luther Martin was eighteen when he graduated from the College
of New Jersey after four years of college and two years of grammar school before that,
indicating a high degree of maturity and wisdom despite his young age. Id. at 95, 111.
Even in England at the time, William Pitt the Younger became Prime Minister at age
twenty-four, the same age George Mason became a judge in Fairfax County, Virginia,
and the same age Charles Dickens wrote The Pickwick Papers. Id. at 149; WILLIAM
HAGUE, WILLIAM PITT THE YOUNGER 5, 118 (2005); John Marshall Gest, THE LAWYER IN

LITERATURE 6 (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1982) (1913). The average age of those
entering universities in the 14 th century was between fifteen and seventeen, and it seems,
from the ages of the founding fathers at graduation, that that stayed the same even in
eighteenth century America. HIBBERT, supra note 245, at 135. For a good study of how
youth in America were always at the forefront of society until very recently, see GLEN
WALLACH, OBEDIENT SONS: THE DISCOURSE OF YOUTH AND GENERATIONS IN AMERICAN

CULTURE 1630-1860 (1997).
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special and lenient treatment. 3°' Over time, corporal punishment was
phased out, and the emphasis shifted to reform and rehabilitation,
especially for youth.3 °6 Somewhere in that process, American society
began to lose its focus on accountability. Our children are no longer the
shining lights our founding fathers once were.3 °7 We have become a
nation of victims, one author claims.308 We no longer take responsibility
for our own actions. We all seem to be victims in need of therapy and
self-esteem, with no corresponding increase in accountability,
professionalism, or industry. 30 9 The Supreme Court bought into this
culture of victimhood by abolishing the death penalty for juveniles.
It
310
seems only a matter of time before it does the same for adults.
What is needed, therefore, is a return to the principle that only the
ability to distinguish between right and wrong should measure
culpability. Medical evidence should be used for what medicine is best
suited for, namely, treatment. To use medical evidence as a basis for
legal decisions is no more legitimate than using economic evidence, and
to disturb well settled legal principles should require a far more
principled approach than the latest MRI images from a laboratory.

305.
DEAN J. CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DELINQUENCY, PROCESSING,
AND THE LAW 7-15 (2001); JOHN R. SUTTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING
DELINQUENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1640-1981 10-89 (1988); ROBERT M. MENNEL,
THORNS & THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1825-1940 (1973);
JOSEPH M. HAWES, CHILDREN IN URBAN SOCIETY: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA 27 (1971); ROBERT S. PICKETT, HOUSE OF REFUGE: ORIGINS OF
JUVENILE REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE, 1815-1857 (1969); FREDRICK J. LUDWIG, YOUTH
AND THE LAW: HANDBOOK OF LAW AFFECTING YOUTH 12-36 (1955). For a history of

juveniles in Britain and Europe, see BECOMING DELINQUENT: BRITISH AND EUROPEAN
YOUTH, 1650-1950 (Pamela Cox & Heather Shore eds., 2002); HEATHER SHORE, ARTFUL
DODGERS : YOUTH AND CRIME IN EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY LONDON (1999).
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See sources in note 305 supra.
For an analysis of how America's children are failing academically, see

CHARLES J. SYKES, DUMBING DOWN OUR KIDS: WHY AMERICA'S CHILDREN FEEL GOOD
ABOUT THEMSELVES BUT CAN'T READ, WRITE, OR ADD (1995).
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CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF VICTIMS 1-13 (1992); see also JAMES
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WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM

70-112 (1997).
309. CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS & SALLY SATEL, ONE NATION UNDER THERAPY: HOW
THE HELPING CULTURE is ERODING SELF-RELIANCE 215-18 (2005).

310. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in Roper seemed to suggest that because of
the "evolving standards of decency," one day the Court might abolish the death penalty.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 587 (Stevens, J., concurring). Recent comments by
Justice Stevens reinforce my view of his comments in Roper. See Editorial, Justice Right

to Worry about Death Penalty: John Paul Stevens, Addressing the American Bar
Association, Takes Note of Improper Verdicts and Urges Caution on Use of Capital
Punishment, DENVER POST, August 9, 2005, at B06.
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VII. Conclusion
If Roper is correct in assuming that juveniles are reckless, voracious
consumers of the present, who have little fear of punishment because of
their underdeveloped brains, then harsher punishments are needed to
control them. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that juveniles
are just as rational as adults, meaning that, at best, juveniles should be
treated just like adults. While there may be legitimate reasons for
abolishing the death penalty for juveniles, or even the death penalty in
general, the reasons given by the Supreme Court in Roper were neither
cogent nor convincing. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will re-visit the
issue, restoring to the states the option to use the death penalty, which is
a necessary tool needed to combat juvenile crime.

